

THE POSITION OF GRIVAS IN US' CYPRUS POLICY

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ABSTRACT

The United States (US) is generally known as the supporter of rightist and anti-communist elements in the world. However, in the case of General Georgios Grivas, the American documents tell that this argument is not completely true.

Grivas was a hero during the civil war in Greece and his anti-communist stance was seen positively in the US. In 1960's, the U.S. perceived a communist threat in Cyprus and the Americans supported Grivas presence in the island. For the Americans, Grivas was also a balancer in controlling President Makarios and a trustful person that could restrain Greek Cypriots from military ventures that would exacerbate the situation through a Greece-Turkey war. However, as the communists were unable to gain significant power and when Greece and Turkey began negotiations, led this argument to lose ground.

Until 1970 ideology dominated American foreign policy. During that period Grivas was valuable for the Americans. However, when détente began in the world, the US strongly supported the relaxation of relations between the parties and sought a compromised agreement through negotiations in Cyprus. Also, when the US turned to warm relations with President Makarios, the balancing role of Grivas in Cyprus politics was finished and the Americans did not support him anymore.

Keywords: *United States, Grivas, Cyprus, Soviet Union, Communism, Détente.*

ÖZET

ABD'İNİN KIBRIS POLİTİKASINDA GRİVAS'IN ROLÜ

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin (ABD) genellikle sağcı ve anti-komünist kişileri desteklediği bilinir. Ancak Amerikan belgeleri bu savın General Yorgo Grivas için tümüyle doğru olmadığını göstermektedir.

Yunan İç Savaşı kahramanlarından Grivas'ın o dönemdeki anti-komünist tavrı ABD tarafından olumlu olarak değerlendirilir. ABD 1960'lı yıllarda Kıbrıs'ta komünizm tehlikesini algılayınca Grivas'ın adada bulunmasına destek verir. Amerikalılar açısından Grivas hem Cumhurbaşkanı

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Makarios'u, hem de askeri bir macerayla Türkiye ile Yunanistan'ın savaşmasına yol açabilecek Kıbrıslı Rumları kontrol edebilecek bir kişidir. Ancak komünistlerin adada önemli bir güç haline gelememesi ve Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın sorularını çözmek için görüşmelere başlaması ABD'nin bu konudaki düşüncesini değiştirir.

ABD'nin dış politikası 1970'lere kadar ideoloji merkezliydi. Bu dönemde Grivas ABD açısından değer taşımaktadır. Ancak Detant döneminin başlamasıyla ABD, taraflar arasındaki ilişkilerin yumuşamasını ve Kıbrıs'ta görüşmeler yoluyla uzlaşmaya varılmasını amaçlar. Bunun yanında, ABD'nin Cumhurbaşkanı Makarios'la iyi ilişkiler geliştirmesi Grivas'ın dengeleyici rolüne olan ihtiyacını sona erdirir ve sonraki süreçte onu desteklemez.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Grivas, Kıbrıs, Sovyetler Birliği, Komünizm, Detant.

Introduction

One of the most important figures in Greece and Cypriot politics was General Georgios Grivas. Grivas gained his fame as the commander of the resistance movement during the Second World War and in the post-war civil war in Greece. His rightist and anti-communist stance made him a hero in some circles.

In this paper the US position –seen in the light of the original documents– on Grivas will be discussed. Until mid-1960s they viewed him positively and thought that he can balance Makarios who had good relations with the Soviet Union and a strong position in the Non-Alignment Movement. Supposedly Grivas had power to limit the influence of Makarios and fight the communists. However, the changes in world and Cypriot politics led the US to reconsider its global politics with a major impact on its Cyprus politics and on the way Grivas was viewed.

The Cold War World

After the War the Soviet Union and the United States emerged as the superpowers. The US claimed that the Soviet Union pursued an expansionist policy and the American aim was to contain it. Here they had three assumptions. Firstly, there was the unity of communist theory and practice and that Moscow directed the struggle between freedom and tyranny. Secondly, there was the threat of communist takeovers. Thirdly, the collaboration with the Soviet Union was impossible and the US had to be the cornerstone of the Free World.¹

¹ Charles O. Lerche, “The Crisis in American World Leadership”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, (May 1966), p. 309-310.

Consequently, the US had three goals:

1. To create and maintain stability in Europe;
2. To maintain a nuclear umbrella over the Western Europe
3. To form a global defense structure.²

To achieve these goals they had three main instruments: the Truman Doctrine; the Marshal Plan and military alliances.

The US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean reflected those goals. The US started to strengthen Greece and Turkey against the Soviet Union in 1940s.³ In 1952 they joined NATO. The US influence in the Middle East started to increase when it replaced UK there.

The Early Years of Grivas

Georgios Grivas was born on July 5, 1898 in Cyprus as an Ottoman Empire subject. In 1916 he went to Greece, became a naturalized subject and accepted into Royal Military Academy in Athens. He graduated in 1919 and then in 1922 he was posted in "Asia Minor". After the defeat of the armies of Greece in 1922 in "Asia Minor" the internal struggle in Greece intensified and consequently Grivas' personal hero General Metaxas established a dictatorship. During this period Grivas experienced "the mechanics of the game of terrorism backed by propaganda." He saw also "how a vast intelligence network was set up as the basis of terrorism that was to follow." When Germans invaded Greece Grivas saw activities of Gestapo, "he saw masked executioners at work" and "children used in the Resistance." During the World War II, in 1944, he obtained the nucleus of a private army which called "X". Most of its personnel had been recruited from nationalist Hellenic forces. At first "X" was restricted to the arms they had been sent by the British. Later when the extreme political Right half recognized "X" as their own army, Grivas was provided with money to buy weapons. All these had to be moved to convenient and safe places of storage, and this taught him many of tricks of the smuggler. During the civil war Grivas and members of X fought alongside British and monarchist

² Oral Sander, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri [Turkish-American Relations]*, Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1979, p. 12.

³ For Karpat, the US appreciation of Turkey was clearly higher because its military and economic potential. The reason was the Turkish strategic position and its role in the American political and defense structures. Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition (1950-1974)*, Leiden, E. J. Brill Publications, 1975, p. 3-4.

forces against the leftist EAM/ELAS fighters. Grivas, as being a strong Christian and anti-communist, retired from the Greek army in 1946. He tried unsuccessfully to transform X into a right-wing pan Hellenic political party.⁴

Grivas and Makarios Found EOKA

When the Ottoman rule ended in 1878 about 25% of Cypriots were Muslims.⁵ The aim of the enosis movement was to unite Cyprus with Greece but until the 1950's the government of Greece did not support it.⁶ The British interests in Cyprus were of strategic nature.⁷ In 1954 they accepted Archbishop Makarios' suggestion that Greece should raise the Cyprus question in the UN. The domestic and Greek Cypriot pressure led on March 23, 1954 the Prime Minister of Greece, Papagos to state that he was going to raise the issue at the UN meeting in September 1954.⁸ Nevertheless, the British were able to block the initiative.

When Grivas' attempts to enter politics in Greece failed he focused on the idea liberating Cyprus from British and the aim of union with Greece. Grivas together with Archbishop Makarios collaborated for preparing the arms struggle in Cyprus. He arrived secretly in Cyprus in the end of 1954 and formed his guerrilla organization namely EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). The commander of EOKA was Grivas and its armed resistance against Britain started on April 1955.⁹ During this period, Grivas successfully put in practice his experiences

⁴ W. Byford-Jones, *Grivas and the Story of EOKA*, London, Robert Hale Limited, 1959, p. 15-39; Pierre Oberling, *The Road To Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus*, New York, Social Science Monographs, Boulder, 1982, p. 40-41; Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kısılcığında Kıbrıs [Cyprus in the Clamp of Nationalism]*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2002, p. 100.

⁵ Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968, p. 6.

⁶ The idea of enosis emerged in the 19th century first for Crete. It then reached also Cyprus and became a central political aspiration.

⁷ Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1977, p. 190.

⁸ Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and Making of Cyprus Problem*, London, Hurst and New York University Press, 1999, p. 55.

⁹ For an evaluation of EOKA by the British Intelligent Service see Niyazi Kızılyürek, "EOKA and April 1", *Cyprus Observer*, 13-19 April 2007. The Turkish Cypriots opposed EOKA and joined the British law-enforcing operations to crush the movement. The aim of EOKA was to leave the Turkish Cypriots alone and to concentrate on the British. When the Turkish Cypriots joined the British, they also became targets. The Turkish Cypriots also created their own underground organization VOLKAN, later on TMT. Halil İbrahim Salih, *Cyprus: The Impact of Divers Nationalism on a State*, Alabama, The University of Alabama Press, 1978, p. 9.

gained in Greece in the World War II and the Civil War. The position of EOKA was complicated however, because the Cypriot communists and the Turkish Cypriots objected its goals.

Before 1954 Cyprus was an internal British matter for the US and it left the actions to the UK. Although US was for the right of self declaration, it did not favor EOKA actions against British troops because the main American interest in the Cold War was to prevent troubles between her allies in the severe situation. Consequently, the US warned Greece not to provoke UK and Turkey.

In 1957 some Cypriot civil servants and the American Consul Belcher benefited the opportunity of a favorable climate. They proposed a solution between partition and enosis in the form of a guaranteed independence according to the American plans of April 1957.¹⁰ After an impasse the Foreign Minister of Greece, Evangelos Averoff-Tozzizza asked the US to support the independence. He argued that it represented a middle position between enosis and partition.¹¹ With this policy change, Greece was prepared to abandon both enosis and self-determination in order to reassure the Turks.

Grivas Rejection of the Formation Republic of Cyprus

Since all the efforts of the UN, UK and NATO failed, Turkey and Greece realized that the solution could only be found bilaterally. They discussed the issue during the NATO Ministers Meeting on December 16-18, 1958, and a mutually acceptable formula for an independent Cyprus was found.¹²

On December 24, Grivas reluctantly announced a unilateral truce in its campaign against the British since his struggle's main objective was not achieved. In the following period, Grivas would openly criticize Makarios who had accepted the solution of independent Cypriot state. In March 1959, he left Cyprus. In Athens he received a hero's welcome as the liberator of the Greek Cypriots and was decorated with the highest honors by the Parliament of Greece and the Athens

¹⁰ Belcher, Airgram from Nicosia G-35, 12.12.58: doc. 747C.00/12-958, box 3285, NARA.

¹¹ Riddleberger, Embtel Athens 3536, 15.6.1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, Central Files, 711.11-EI/6-1558, Department of State. Doc. 227. Available: < <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus58-60x1/index.html>. >. (Pointed 18.11.2006).

¹² Whitney, Embtel London 3289, 20.12.1958: FRUS, 1958-1960, Central Files, 747C.00/12-2058, Department of State. Doc. 298. < <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus58-60x1/index.html>. >. (Pointed 18.11.2006).

Academy and promoted to the rank of General.

Finally in 1959, the negotiations between the parties produced an agreement on the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.¹³ Cyprus was declared a republic on August 16, 1960, Archbishop Makarios as the President and Dr. Fazıl Küçük as the Vice-President.

In 1962 President Makarios launched the troubles with his aim to change the constitution. The Turkish Cypriots saw it as an effort to limit their autonomy and a civil war broke out. İnönü's Government in Turkey responded with air force demonstrations over Cyprus and also threatened with an invasion. The US intervened and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball instructed the Ambassadors in Nicosia and Athens to convey to Makarios and Prime Minister of Greece, George Papandreou that Turkey was serious and "an immediate turning off of the violence was essential."¹⁴ For the United States clash in Cyprus would poison the relations between Turkey and Greece. Consequently, the United States opposed Turkey's plans to land troops on the island.¹⁵ The US believed that the problems between her allies had to be solved by peaceful means.

Grivas between Makarios and United States

While the situation got worse in Cyprus Makarios on March 13, 1964 departed for Athens to meet Papandreou and Grivas.¹⁶ There he accused the Turkish Cypriots of creating a situation which would give Turkey a pretext for the intervention. Makarios and Grivas agreed on some plans for the island. Grivas returned to Cyprus in June 1964 to take over the Supreme command of the Greek Cypriot forces organized under Makarios' National Guard as well as the military division of Greece sent to Cyprus by the government of George Papandreou to assist in island's defense against a possible attack of Turkey. Belcher reported that Makarios, on his arrival to Nicosia, told the press that if Turkey moved, Greece also would move. The Government of Cyprus had an understanding with Greece that it

¹³ Metin Tamkoç, *The Turkish Cypriot State*, London, K. Rüstem & Brother, 1988, p. 65.

¹⁴ Rusk, Deptel Circular 1675, 12.3.1964: POL 23-8, box 2082, NARA. Joseph believes that after the March 4 Resolution of 1964, an accordance of goals and policies existed between Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus: A solution of the Cyprus problem should be based on partitioning of the island; the Treaty of Guarantee was valid and that Makarios' government was unlawful. Joseph Savva Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics*, London, Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 48.

¹⁵ Karpat, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁶ Labouisse, Embtel Athens 1398, 13.3.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2082, NARA.

expected Turkey's move and was prepared for it.¹⁷

The signs of war were there and now the Americans had to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey. The US immediately organized separate meetings with their Prime Ministers in Washington D.C. to solve the Cyprus conflict. However, the Secretary of State considered Grivas' return as critical but useful. According to Dean Rusk, if İnönü and Papandreou talks would fail, the US might face a new critical situation. The impact of Grivas' presence on Cyprus, or the clashes on the island, could further complicate the situation. However, Grivas could impose more discipline on the Greek Cypriot irregulars, rectify the slide toward Soviets, extend the hand of friendship to Turkish Cypriots and protect them from the Greek Cypriot extremists, and actually contribute to the solution. However, it was not easy to calm down the Turkey's anxiety toward Grivas and to forestall its reactions. For Rusk, if Greece would not act, the balance of power in Ankara could change and moderate İnönü government would fall and the US couldn't do anything about it. Here, Washington's aim was to demonstrate to Papandreou the threat Greece, Turkey and the West would face if Greece and Turkey could not reach a compromise.¹⁸

For the Americans enosis could be the solution in Cyprus. Ball found Papandreou's repeated references to "enosis" as a healthy sign. Ball believed that all NATO members should regard enosis as a useful component in any final solution. Enosis would mean that a NATO government rather than "the wolf in [...] priest's clothing" was in charge. In order to reach enosis "some of the provisions were made for those Turkish Cypriots who wanted to leave" the island, and "to make this palatable to Turkey there would have to be some kind of [...] territorial concessions by Greece."¹⁹

Grivas' charisma not only attracted the Americans but also President Makarios. Both had plans to benefit Grivas for their own causes: for the Americans Grivas was to control or to topple Makarios. The same time, for Makarios Grivas was the weapon to fight against Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.

¹⁷ Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 963, 13.3.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2082, NARA. Andreas Papandreou described the position of his father as follows: "Makarios demanded that we dispatch our Air Force to provide his cover. We did not, not because we did not wish to, but because it was technically impossible. Cyprus was far [from] Greek air-bases, and our fighters would have had no more than two minutes flying [time] over Cyprus. We would therefore only have provoked Turkey into further action without offering substantive aid to the Cypriot ground forces." Andreas Papandreou, *Namlunun Ucunda Demokrasi [Democracy at Gunpoint]*, translated by Mehmet Emin Yıldırım-Semih Koray, İstanbul, Üçüncü Dünya Yayınları, 1977, p. 177.

¹⁸ Rusk, Deptel to London 8463, 21.6.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, 2086, NARA.

¹⁹ Belcher, *op. cit.*

Acheson Plan and Grivas

İnönü visited Washington on June 22-23 and Papandreou on June 24-25, 1964. For the President Johnson, the Cyprus problem and the Greece-Turkey relations were of a great concern.²⁰ Although the United States did not have a magic formula she could assist Greece and Turkey in finding a solution. The President was ready to make available the services of the former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson in quiet and frank talks between the representatives of Greece and Turkey.²¹

Ball foresaw three problems in the talks: Firstly, the maintenance of security on the island; secondly, Makarios' possible disruptive activities and thirdly, possible communist activities. Therefore, the US, Turkey and Greece had to hurry up. The philosophy of the initiative ("the Acheson Plan"), is best explained in a telegram to Ball on July 14. The goal was "some sort of enosis". However, to implement enosis "there were three Turkey's requisites: National prestige, national security and welfare of [the] Turkish Cypriots." The plan had to save the security of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey might get a "sovereign base area on Cyprus. The other condition was a "special arrangement, under Greece sovereignty" to create one or two small 'eparchis'²² and give local self-rule to the Turkish Cypriots under the Greece authority.²³

In principle, Prime Minister İnönü had no objections to this plan,²⁴ but Greece had problems. Labouisse informed Acheson that Makarios found the plan totally unacceptable. He opposed any cantonal system and did not like the proposed minority rights. Makarios also asked Papandreou to give a negative reply to Acheson. Nevertheless, Papandreou wanted to deliberate the issue.²⁵

As we can see, the US firstly wanted to solve the problem within NATO and local actors could not participate in the discussions.

²⁰ Memcon between the US and the Turkish Delegations, Washington, 22.6.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2086, NARA.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Eparchis: the Greek term for "district".

²³ Acheson to Ball, Embtel Geneva 114, 14.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2087, NARA. The plan would give Turk[ish] Cypriots assurance that not only their lives but their property, business, and way of life would be safeguarded".

²⁴ Memcon between the U.S. and the Turkish Delegations, Washington, 22.6.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2086, NARA.

²⁵ Labouisse, (for Acheson) Embtel Athens 172, 30.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2087, NARA. Labouisse had received the information from ERE leader, Canellopoulos.

As Acheson rightly assessed, the American initiative depended on Papandreou,²⁶ who was desperate with stance of Makarios. Makarios' plan was to appeal to the UN at the next General Assembly. He was sure that the Socialist and Non-Aligned countries would vote for his cause and that he could get a strong resolution in favor of "unfettered independence", self-determination of the majority. The American preference was a NATO solution and they opposed the internationalization of the Cyprus problem as the opportunity for the Soviet Union to get involved.

When the parties in Geneva were formulating their positions so did Makarios in Cyprus. After his visit in Athens he had free hands and he tried to bring about a *fait accompli* in Cyprus to prevent Greece move in Geneva. As Drousiotis put it, "Makarios favored a military operation in Cyprus, especially at that particular moment in time when Papandreou continued to participate in the Geneva talks, despite an agreement between them."²⁷

The military operation took place in Mansoura-Kokkina area where the Turkish Cypriots had access to the sea. When Turkey recognized the Greek Cypriot preparations she once more threatened Makarios with a military intervention but the threat did not work and on August 6 the hostilities started. Ball criticized Grivas that he failed to carry out his commitment to restrain Greek Cypriots from military ventures that would exacerbate the situation. For the Americans this was the justification for Grivas' presence on the island and for the build up the Greek regular troops on the island.²⁸ During the hostilities, the Americans put pressure on the Greek Cypriots for a ceasefire to avert the threat of a Greece-Turkey war and also to save Acheson's initiative. The cooperation between Makarios and Grivas reached now a climax and Makarios agreed with Grivas that the operation should be completed in the area.²⁹ Nevertheless, the strong US pressure³⁰ and the Turkey's air

²⁶ Acheson to Ball, Embtel Geneva 241, 28.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2087, NARA.

²⁷ Makarios Drousiotis, *The First Partition: Cyprus 1963-1964*, Nicosia, Alfadi Publications, 2008, p. 241. For Drousiotis, "even a limited conflict would dramatically exacerbate Greco-Turkish relations and would bring about the swift demise of the Acheson plan." Although Salih shares Drousiotis' views on Makarios he criticizes the position of Athens. According to Salih, Greece was partly responsible because they had supplied Makarios with men, arms and moral support. Salih, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

²⁸ Drousiotis, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

³⁰ Ball to Belcher, Flash Deptel 128, 9.8.64: SDSNF, 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2089, NARA. If Makarios acted according to his ultimatum and ordered operations against the civilians, Turkey

strikes worked and Makarios accepted a cease-fire and Grivas had to resign.

As mentioned above, to solve the Cyprus problem for good and to prevent the Soviet threat the Americans exploited the enosis solution. Their enosis scenarios included the “enosis by coup” by Grivas³¹ and the declaration of enosis by the parliaments of Cyprus and Greece.³² The problem was how to reach a secret agreement between Greece and Turkey because Ankara did not trust Papandreou and Grivas.³³

The operation in Washington D.C., Athens, Ankara and Geneva continued.³⁴ According to Ball “[a] major operation is underway with [the] Greek and Turkish Governments” and “[a] very big play is in motion”³⁵ The King would meet Grivas with the approval and preferably in the presence of Papandreou and Canellopoulos. King’s points to Grivas were: Firstly, the Government backed the US plan and believed that it should be carried out. Secondly, a “quick solution through the American proposal is the only door still open [in] preventing the Communization of Cyprus without [...] a Turk[ish] attack.” Thirdly, the US assured Greece that “enosis is immediately affected through a peaceful bargain with the Turkey.” On the basis of the American proposal also provided substantial assistance for the rebuilding of Cyprus and the development of its resources. Ball believed that the American offer to Grivas was an “opportunity for him to fulfill his Dighenis role and thus reclaim

would have retaliated. General Sunalp told Acheson: “If they kill any Turks, we will kill double the number of Greeks.” Acheson, Embtel Geneva 166, 21.7.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2090, NARA.

³¹ Kızılyürek believes that the US sought to solve Cyprus problem by presenting Acheson Plan. When Makarios rejected the plan the US tried to get rid of from Makarios and had secret contacts with Grivas. However the US plan did not work because of attitudes of Grivas. Niyazi Kızılyürek, “Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti’nin Yeniden Yapılanması (1960-1974): İki Toplumlu Devletten Tek Toplumlu Kıbrıs Devletine [Reconstructing the Republic of Cyprus (1960-1974): From Bi-communal State to Uni-communal Cyprus State]”, Niyazi Kızılyürek (ed.), *Kıbrıs Yazıları* (Milliyetçilik Özel Sayısı), No. 13, (2011), p. 73.

³² Labouisse, Embtel Athens 233, 8.8.1964: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2089, NARA; Acheson to Rusk, Embtel 426, 19.8.1964: Records of Under-Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Athens Telegrams 1 to Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams 1, box 14, NARA.

³³ Acheson to Rusk, Embtel 425, 19.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Athens Telegrams 1 to Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams 1, box 14, NARA.

³⁴ US put the Grivas-Georkajis proposal for a coup on hold, Petros Garoufalios, the Minister for National Defence of Greece, arrived in Cyprus carrying the Government of Greece proposal for Enosis by coup. Makarios Drousiotis, *The First Partition: Cyprus 1963-1964*, Nicosia, Alfadi Publications, 2008, p. 279.

³⁵ Ball to Belcher, Deptel Flash 206, 21.8.1964: POL 27 CYP, box 2091, NARA.

Cyprus for Hellenism and save it from Communism to which Makarios is leading it.”³⁶ Here, the US offered Grivas the biggest lifetime role and expected a positive respond. In the end, the American plan failed because Papandreou thought that it would not solve the Cyprus problem: the last word belonged to the leaders and people of Cyprus.³⁷

Ball did not stop. He supposed that the government of Greece was “afraid to move against Makarios unless Grivas [was] willing to take responsibility.” Hence, Ball proposed an American “action to influence General Grivas - which we have not yet done.” Ball received advice from CAS Headquarters that “the Greek military have the strength on the Island to take care of Makarios if the order is given.”³⁸ When Grivas did not show the willingness to move in Cyprus the US trust on him began to decrease. Grivas had been “on the island for over two months but he did not act in the beginning when his popularity was high. He shows no sign of acting now unless we are prepared to guarantee against the invasion of Turkey.” Ball reached the conclusion “that Grivas will [not] remove Makarios if we [the U.S.] let the situation alone.”³⁹

The spirit of Acheson plan was to offer more responsibility to Greece and Turkey. The responsibility to prevent the war was on their shoulders, and the first job in this line was to remove Makarios from power. For that Grivas and Greece had enough troops on the island and the US also could offer a contribution. The only missing link was that Grivas did not get the guarantees that Turkey would not intervene, and consequently, he did not act. The American initiative in Geneva came to nothing and they now turned to the UN to take a leading role in Cyprus.

Grivas as a Troublemaker

The US has now lost its confidence in Grivas. The next step was that in 1965 Grivas became a troublemaker. He again triggered skirmishes between the National Guard and Turkish Cypriots in Famagusta.⁴⁰ The Americans regarded the Greek

³⁶ Ball to Labouisse, Deptel Flash 347, 22.8.1964: POL 27 CYP, box 2091, NARA.

³⁷ Labouisse for Acheson, Embtel Athens 381, 23.8.1964: Records of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1966, Lot 74D272, Entry 5175, Cyprus Crisis-Athens Telegrams 1 to Cyprus Crisis-Geneva Telegrams 1, box 14., NARA.

³⁸ Ball to Acheson, Flash Deptel 477, 23.8.1964: POL 27 CYP, box 2091, NARA.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 222, 4.11.1965: POL 27 CYP, box 2098, NARA; Goldberg, Embtel USUN New York 1844, 7.11.1965: POL 27 CYP, box 2098, NARA. For the UN arrangement for

Cypriots as the guilty party.⁴¹ For the first –but not for the last– time the US was disappointed with Grivas and had to spent much energy on the island and in the UN to stop the fighting.

Since 1965, the United States encouraged Turkey and Greece to engage in the bilateral talks because it would prevent them from fighting. As Turkey rejected enosis, it also realized that partition could not lead to a lasting solution: thus, the best option was some form of “independence.”⁴² Makarios now had a similar view on enosis: it was impossible without substantial concessions. Consequently, the independence turned to a more attractive solution.⁴³ After 1967 also the US did not support enosis and preferred the independent Cyprus. As the Cypriots had for a while remained calm it was possible to develop an illusion where the status quo could offer a solution and the communities would live in harmony

The US policy also influenced Makarios. When he learned that the repression of the Turkish Cypriots was not “productive” he launched in September a peace offensive with a “normalization plan”. Although Grivas criticized Makarios he decided “to remove several restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots as a precondition to a peaceful coexistence on the island.”⁴⁴

With the fighting Grivas had now became a major problem for the US, but in fact the Turks provoked the Greek Cypriots.⁴⁵ The same time the Greek Cypriots tried to show their “governmental power” and attacked the Turkish Cypriots.

disengagement in Famagusta, see: Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 292, 7.11.1965: POL 27 CYP, box 2098, NARA.

⁴¹ Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 227, 4.11.1965: POL 27 CYP, box 2098, NARA.

⁴² Belcher, Airgram Nicosia A-249, 2.6.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2098, NARA.

⁴³ Talbot, Embtel Athens 1423, 22.9.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2024, NARA. For the evaluations of the U.S. officials see also Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 390, 28.9.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2024, NARA and Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 355, 19.9.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2024, NARA. The Greek Cypriot view on independent Cyprus was a country under the Greek Cypriot hegemony. Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, p. 123.

⁴⁴ Belcher, Airgram from Nicosia A-50, 5.9.1967: POL 2 CYP, box 2021, NARA. Makarios’ plan was, in time, to unman all armed posts and fortifications, to remove all permanent roadblocks, and to provide absolute freedom of movement.

⁴⁵ Sevgül Uludağ, “Kıbrıs: Anlatılmamış Öyküler [Cyprus: Untold Stories]”, No. 539, *Yenidüzen*, 26 February 2008.

According to Hughes the “key to the situation is General Grivas,”⁴⁶ as he was the Commander of the National Guard and also of the troops of Greece in Cyprus.⁴⁷

When the Turkish Cypriots fighters prevented Greek Cypriot patrols from entering the mixed village of Ayios Theodoros the Greek Cypriots decided to open the road by force. The action triggered great concern among the Turkish Cypriots.⁴⁸ According to Nicolet Grivas’ aim was also to humiliate them.⁴⁹ Furthermore, it became obvious that Grivas was not able to control the troops.

For Turkey, the Greek Cypriots had many years violated the constitution and the troops of Greece had illegally entered Cyprus. The Government of Turkey decided on November 17, to confront the junta of Greece with a message. There Turkey placed the responsibility for the incidents on the Government of Greece. Grivas’ provocation and the military forces of Greece in Cyprus since 1964 had clearly increased the tension.⁵⁰

In Athens, Ambassador Talbot urged Prime Minister Kollias to call Grivas back to Athens.⁵¹ Finally, it was the King who ordered Grivas to return.⁵² The Americans thought that the departure of Grivas from Cyprus might create a positive respond in Ankara. When Hart was informed that Grivas was leaving Cyprus, he secretly informed the Turks and urged them not to stage more fighting.⁵³ As the State Department officials asked for an immediate action, Secretary Rusk proposed to send a personal representative of the President to the region, and the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R. Vance was appointed to this post. Vance

⁴⁶ Hughes to Rusk, Intelligence Note 919, Subject: “Turkish Forces Remain on Alert in Wake of Fighting on Cyprus”, 17.11.1967: POL 27 CYP XR POL 27-14 CYP/UN XR POL GREECE-TUR XR DEF 9 GREECE XR POL 29 TUR, box 2024, NARA.

⁴⁷ Battle to Rusk, Memorandum: Cyprus Situation Report for your Luncheon with the President”, 15.11.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2024, NARA.

⁴⁸ Hughes to Rusk, Intelligence Note 919, 15.11.1967: POL 27 CYP, Box 2024, NARA. Grivas even took a newspaper editor and photographer to record “his success in beating down Turkish intransigence.” The Greek newspapers gave the “victory” a wide coverage.

⁴⁹ Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*, Möhnese, Bibliopolis, 2001, p. 353.

⁵⁰ Hart, Embtel Ankara 2393, 18.11.1967: POL 27 CYP, 2024, NARA.

⁵¹ Talbot, Embtel Athens 2186, 17.11.1967: POL 27 CYP, 2024, NARA.

⁵² Talbot, Embtel Athens 2182, 17.11.1967: POL 27 CYP, 2024, NARA.

⁵³ Hart, Embtel Ankara 2388, 18.11.1967: POL 27 CYP XR DEF 19 US GREECE, 2024, NARA.

shuttled between Ankara and Athens as an “honest broker” and, consequently, the peace in the island was secured.⁵⁴

Grivas’ departure was an achievement for Turkey. In the American eyes, the permission of the junta in Greece for Grivas to attack the Turkish Cypriots was not logical because Turkey could never accept it and used it as a pretext for the demarche. Ambassador Talbot considered Grivas’ attack as a “monumental stupidity”.⁵⁵ Of course, the major concession of Greece was the withdrawal of the 7 000 troops and heavy weapons from Cyprus.⁵⁶ Here Greece understood its limited capabilities to confront air raids of Turkey.

Until the 1967 attack of the Greek Cypriots, the U.S. did not ask Greece to withdraw Grivas or the troops. For the Americans, the military troops of Greece in Cyprus were a guarantee against the communist threat and a tool to topple Makarios if needed.⁵⁷ Consequently, they supported their presence. It was only in March 1967 when the US started to see Grivas and the troops as a problem and that their departure would improve the Greco-Turkish relations.⁵⁸

When Grivas and the troops of Greece left Cyprus one of the important consequences was Makarios’ new vision of enosis. On January 12, he declared that “while enosis was still the desire of the Greek Cypriots, this goal was for the foreseeable future not obtainable, and that in the meantime a feasible rather than a desirable solution must be sought.”⁵⁹

The Changing World and the US Foreign Policy in the Early 1970s

In 1970 the US Foreign Policy started to change. In August the State Department formulated the new look of the United States’ “foreign affairs policies

⁵⁴ Rusk, Deptel 73240 to Ankara, 22.11.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2024, NARA. Ehrlich explains the story of Vance mission in Thomas Ehrlich, 1974, p. 112.

⁵⁵ Talbot, Embtel Athens 2224, 20.11.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2024, NARA.

⁵⁶ Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 1178, 17.1.1968: POL 27 CYP, box 2026, NARA.

⁵⁷ Rusk, Deptel to Ankara 143499, 24.2.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2023, NARA.

⁵⁸ Katzenbach, Deptel to Athens 159364, etc., 21.3.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2023, NARA; Belcher, Embtel Nicosia 1388, 23.3.1967: POL 27 CYP, box 2023, NARA; Rusk, Deptel to Athens 166110, etc., 31.3.67: POL 27 CYP, box 2023, NARA.

⁵⁹ Michael Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, Edinburgh, Q Press, 1979, p. 99.

and problems”⁶⁰ with four important characteristics. The first one was “the growing interdependence of nations,” and the second one nationalism which could work for or against the American interests. Anti-Americanism had become the sine qua non of nationalistic movements and there were attempts to stake out independent policies to strengthen the national identity. The third was the evolution on the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union “from one of strategic superiority to one of strategic parity.” Yet, the politics, capabilities, intentions and reactions of the USSR continued to be the main U.S. concern although it was now possible to have a dialogue with the Soviet Union to identify common interests and limits of tolerance. The US started to move from confrontation to détente and from an ideology-driven to pragmatic foreign policy. The change led to Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the SALT.

The US regional policies –as for Turkey, Greece and Cyprus- were designed according to the global policy. When the US global policy now changed so did the regional. In the late 1960s, the US strongly supported the relaxation of relations between Turkey and Greece and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The goal was to reach an agreement. However, the positive atmosphere did not bring about a solution and the US had to adopt a new line.

Grivas as a Troublemaker – Act 2.

On April 5, 1970, Grivas addressed the anniversary of EOKA organized by the National Cyprus Student Union in Greece.⁶¹ Grivas claimed that the Government of Cyprus opposed the enosis agreed in the secret Greece-Turkey talks in 1965. Grivas called upon the youngsters to ignore the “feasible solution callings” and to remain committed to enosis.⁶² For Ambassador Tasca this was highly inopportune because such statements could cause the Cypriot Government real concern after the recent events on the island. Tasca’s worries became true when the Cypriot Deputy Director General Pelagias told the American officials in Nicosia that Grivas’ latest outburst “now being read in terms of March 8 assassination attempt and subsequent coup rumors.”⁶³

⁶⁰ The information below is from the paper prepared by the Planning and Coordination Staff at the State Department: Briefing for the Under Secretary: “Foreign Affairs Policies and Problems”, 28.8.1970: Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Lot 72D170 Committee to Facilitate Travel, 5/1970, box 49, NARA.

⁶¹ Tasca, Embtel Nicosia 1640, 6.4.1970: POL 27 CYP, box 2226, NARA.

⁶² Tasca, Embtel Athens 1700, 8.4.1970: POL 27 CYP, box 2226, NARA.

⁶³ Popper, Embtel Nicosia 562, 8.4.1970: POL 27 CYP, box 2226, NARA.

To overcome the deadlock in the intercommunal talks Secretary Rogers on August 8 asked for the views of the American officials.⁶⁴ Sisco noticed that when the parties in Cyprus were not negotiating, the probability of violence increased. Hence, he advised that the US should find a way to continue the talks.

Also a new one problem emerged in Cyprus. Grivas secretly returned to the island on 31 August 1971. He organized a terrorist group called EOKA-B which was a kind of continuation of the anti-British organization EOKA formed in 1950s.⁶⁵

It is worth mentioning that Turkey did not oppose Grivas' return to the island. Mayes thinks that Turkey believed that "Grivas could be instrumental in forcing Makarios to accept an agreement of Greece and Turkey."⁶⁶ However, the US position was different. The Americans continuously told the President that the US saw Grivas' return "as potentially disruptive" and "unwelcome." The US supported the authority of the Republic of Cyprus and in the case of Grivas' challenge, it hoped to contain and remove him from Cyprus.⁶⁷ As mentioned above, after the discussions in the State Department, the US ruled out the enosis option and continued to support the intercommunal talks. Moreover, it was pushing Turkey and Greece to find a way out.

After long discussions the expanded talks where also the advisors of Turkey and Greece participated were opened by the UN Secretary General, Waldheim, on June 8. As the talks began the US felt comfortable and the only problem was to

⁶⁴ Rogers, Deptel to Nicosia 147911, 12.8.1971: POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA.

⁶⁵ The question of whether Grivas was sent by the Greek junta is problematic. Mayes writes that Grivas returned without the approval of Papadopoulos (Stanley Mayes, *Makarios: A Bibliography*, London, Macmillan Press, 1981, p. 214.) Coufoudakis has a different opinion and he thinks that 73 years old Grivas could not return to Cyprus without the approval of Papadopoulos (Van Coufoudakis, "United States Foreign Policy and Cyprus Question: An Interpretation", *Millennium*, Vol. 5., (1976-77), p. 258.) However, for Clerides, it was obvious from the events of 1967 in Cyprus that the junta could not control Grivas and he was not the right man to influence Makarios for further concessions. For Clerides, Grivas came to Cyprus with the support of "certain circles within the military opposing the junta leaders, and by Greek Cypriot groups opposing Makarios." Clerides seems to be right in his opinion. Crawford, Embtel Nicosia 1648, 9.9.1971, POL CYP-GREECE XR POL 7 CYP, box 2229, NARA.

⁶⁶ Mayes, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

⁶⁷ Crawford, Embtel Nicosia, 1837, 9.10.1971: POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA; The American official views on Grivas explained in: Rogers, Deptel Nicosia 189029, 15.10.1971: POL 27 CYP, box 2227, NARA; Also see: Sisco to Tasca and Popper (Irwin signed), Deptel, 214164, 25.11.1971: POL 27 CYP, box 2224, NARA

secure the continuation of the talks. The US had to control the parties to keep the talks on the track. The second phase of the talks started on August 8. The previous day Popper and Osorio-Tafall met Makarios and evaluated the prospects for progress.⁶⁸

Also the signs of a clash inside the Greek Cypriots emerged at Makarios' press conference in September 29.⁶⁹ Makarios talked about arms smuggling to Cyprus and accused Grivas of distributing them to illegal groups. According to Popper, two financiers of the arms were the Bishops of Kitium and Kyrenia.⁷⁰ On October 11, Ambassador Popper reported two announcements in Cyprus. Three Bishops and a pro-Grivas faction of ex-EOKA members announced two declarations which were quite similar. The Bishops attacked the intercommunal talks and called for a referendum on enosis. Furthermore, the ex-EOKA members denounced negotiations and asked the Government of Greece to support Grivas.⁷¹ The Bishops and Grivas formed a front to topple Makarios. For Popper, the main significance of the meeting was the unqualified denunciation of the intercommunal talks.⁷²

As the domestic conflict in Cyprus had now turned more severe, the State Department became worried. Consequently, on November 17, Rogers sent to the US Ambassador one of the most important messages in American Cyprus policy. For the Department, "U.S. good offices should be undertaken before [the] crisis makes [the] costs too high." The American officials reviewed their positions for the following (hypothetical) circumstances: If local talks were on the verge of breakdown, particularly as a result of actual or threatened action by extremists (most likely Grivas), the US should be prepared to intervene, probably in support of the Secretary General's initiative and with help from Greece, Turkey and UK, to take a strong stand against the extremists' action and for the continuation of the talks.⁷³

In the beginning of 1973, the intra-Greek violence in Cyprus increased dramatically. Makarios adopted a tough line and on January 27, he told the press

⁶⁸ Popper, Embtel Nicosia 1524, 8.8.1972: POL 27 CYP, box 2229, NARA.

⁶⁹ Popper, Embtel Nicosia 1833, 2.10.1972: POL 27 CYP XR DEF 12-5 CYP, box 2229, NARA.

⁷⁰ Popper, Embtel Nicosia 1856, 5.10.1972: POL 27 CYP XR DEF 19-8 ARAB-CYP, box 2229, NARA.

⁷¹ Popper, Embtel Nicosia 1891, 11.10.1972: POL 27 CYP XR SOC 12-1 CYP, box 2229, NARA.

⁷² Popper, Embtel Nicosia 1925, 17.10.1972: POL 27 CYP, box 2229, NARA. In their meeting a resolution was passed covering five points: 1) Insistence on the demand for enosis; 2) Enosis was feasible through self-determination; 3) Opposition to the intercommunal talks; 4) Support of the Bishops in their demand for removal of Makarios; 5) Absolute trust in Grivas.

⁷³ Rogers, Deptel to Nicosia 209502, 17.11.1972: POL 27 CYP, box 2229, NARA.

that “General Grivas had betrayed EOKA and his terrorist acts would no longer be tolerated.”⁷⁴ In the Presidential elections, Makarios was the only candidate and he was re-elected without a formal vote. Clearly, Grivas did not dare to challenge him with a pro-Enosis candidate.⁷⁵

In Cyprus, the parties did not change their positions and continued their struggle. For example, pro-enosis powers raided Koutrafas and Prastio Police Stations on 9 and 10 April, and Makarios sharply attacked Grivas for his “criminal acts” which would cause a national disaster.⁷⁶ Also his rivals were active and decided to meet on April 12 to consider further actions.

Since Grivas returned to Cyprus in 1971 the US officials assumed that “he would hold his hand until the success in the intercommunal talks appeared imminent.” Grivas, however, might have thought that he had to act now. For the Americans, Makarios held the initiative in Cyprus. He had eliminated the threat of the Bishops and captured Grivas’ deputy Savros Stavrou and other persons in the clandestine leadership. The Americans considered that Grivas would campaign against Makarios for enosis and would choose to play in a final “Götterdämmerung” of his career.⁷⁷

The US officials thought that although it was unclear how much control Athens exerted on Grivas, Papadopoulos’ regime used him to subvert Makarios. However, the junta publicly condemned the kidnapping and violence but until August 24, it avoided the explicit condemnation of Grivas. Then, President Papadopoulos denounced Grivas by name, accusing him of undermining the National Center (that is Greece) and local talks and ignoring the “recommendations” of the Government of Greece, and calling on him to stop the armed actions immediately.⁷⁸ The Americans saw the intra-Greek Cypriot violence as a major threat that could spill over into the Turkish Cypriots and then Turkey would act in Cyprus.

⁷⁴ Popper, Embtel Nicosia 158, 29.1.1973: POL 23-8 CYP, box 2225, NARA.

⁷⁵ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. III, Nicosia, Alithia Publishing Co. Ltd., 1990, p. 261. In the Turkish Cypriot sector, Denktaş was elected as the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

⁷⁶ Popper, Embtel Nicosia 830, 11.4.1973: POL 15 CYP XR SOC 12-1 CYP XR POL 23-8 CYP, box 2225, NARA.

⁷⁷ Cyprus: A Sharpening Conflict, 29.8.1972: Executive Secretariat, Issues of Current Foreign relations, Issue no. 35, Entry 369J, box 30, NARA.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

When Grivas died in the beginning of 1974, the Greeks and the Greeks Cypriots in his funeral looked –but only few ones really were sad.

Conclusion

In the 1960s, the US perceived a communist threat in Cyprus. Until mid-1960s, Grivas was a useful for the US as a balancer to Makarios and as the leader of the rightist circles. The Americans believed that his underground organization could suppress the communist activities. However, this argument disappeared as the communists did not gain significant power in Cyprus and also because of the détente in 1970s.

The United States began to shape a new global policy. The anti-communist struggle turned moderate and Grivas became obsolete. The parties of the Cyprus problem also changed their policies and Turkey, Greece and Makarios started to support independent Cyprus, and so did the US. Consequently, Grivas was not an useful instrument in the American foreign policy after mid 1960s. He did not act in the line of US scenarios during 1964 and in 1967 he became a real troublemaker with provocative actions in the island. In order to cool Turkey the US had to spend enormous energy. For the Americans, putting Grivas aside was not a free choice but a way to balance the interests of the domestic and international parties.

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