

UNITED STATES AND LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR POLITICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST

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ABSTRACT

During the Cold War period “containment” was the United States (US) policy against the Soviet Union (SU). During the early stages of the Cold War the United States firstly aimed at focusing on economic/oil issues, but got then directly involved in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries when it reckoned that the SU was penetrating to the region through ant-Western countries namely Egypt, Iraq and Syria.

The establishment of Israel created one of the most important crises in US relations with the Middle East. For the United States the enemy was the Soviet Union. However, the Arabs saw Israel as their enemy. In the containment of the Soviets this created a permanent structural problem for the United States. Israel became the main partner of the US in the region, but simultaneously the US had to compete with the SU in constructing its Arab sphere of interests in the region. Consequently, the US found itself in a labyrinth to find the way that secured its and Israel’s interest on the best possible way.

In this article it will be discussed if change or continuity was the main character of the US foreign policy in the Middle East after the Cold War.

Keywords: Middle East, United States, Soviet Union, Cold War, Détente, Russia, Israel, Arab states.

AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ VE SOĞUK SAVAŞ SİYASETİNİN GÜNÜMÜZDEKİ ORTA DOĞU ÜZERİNDEKİ MİRASI

ÖZET

“Çevreleme politikası” Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Soğuk Savaş döneminde Sovyetler Birliğine karşı uyguladığı politikayı anlatır. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Soğuk Savaşın ilk aşamasında Orta Doğu’ya öncelikle ekonomi/petrol konuları çerçevesinde ilgi gösterirken ilerleyen dönemde Sovyetler Birliği’nin Batı karşıtı olan Mısır, Irak ve Suriye üzerinden bölgeye girmesi nedeniyle o da bölge ülkelerinin içişlerine doğrudan karışmaya başlamıştır. İsrail devletinin kurulması ABD’nin bölge ilişkilerinde yaşadığı en önemli krize neden olmuştur. Bunun nedeni ABD açısından en büyük tehdit Sovyetler Birliği iken Araplar açısından bunun İsrail olarak görülmesidir. Bu durum ABD’nin Sovyetleri çevreleme politikalarında yapısal bir problem yaratmıştır. İsrail ABD’nin bölgedeki en önemli ortağı olurken, Washington Ortadoğu’da kendi etki alanını oluşturmak için Moskova ile yarışmak zorunda kalmıştır. Sonuç olarak ABD hem kendinin hem de İsrail’in çıkarlarını en iyi şekilde korumaya çalışırken kendini içinden çıkılmaz bir durumda bulmuştur. Bu makalede. ABD

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politikalarının ana unsurlarının Soğuk Savaş sonrasında bir değişime uğrayıp uğramadığı tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Orta Doğu, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Sovyetler Birliği, Soğuk Savaş, Yumuşama, Rusya, İsrail, Arap devletleri.*

Introduction

At the end of the World War II the United States and the Soviet Union became two superpowers in the globe. According to the US the Soviet Union was a revisionist country and aimed to expand its sphere of influence beyond its borders. The United States produced the policy of “containment” all around the world in order to stop the Soviets. Actually, the US designed its global political leadership before the end of the war and this marked an end to its isolation policy. Before the end of the World War II, the two institutions of the US the Department of State and the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) had designed the basics of the new US policy. The new US policy had pursued the ‘Grand Area’ (liberal economic area) for the US investors and exporters (Bostanoğlu, 1990). According to this policy, the US could not live in a totalitarian world and needed an “integrated liberal economic area” to survive. The United States and United Kingdom’s (UK) discussions during the World War II has produced the Atlantic Charter, which aimed to give more responsibility to the Americans after the war. With this decision, the UK has transformed its mission in the Eastern Mediterranean region to the US, who was also becoming the leader of the West.

Towards the Cold War Confrontation

It was a dramatic development to see the allied powers to defeat the German bloc confronting each other. However, the United States had suspicions regarding the intentions of the Soviet Union since the Great October Revolution. The attitude of Moscow in the Polish question, in the Iranian crisis, in the Greek civil war and its territorial claims on Turkey have increased the US suspicions towards the Soviet Union. On June 27, 1945 a paper prepared by the Department of State has explained the possible impact of communism to the United States. The Department believed that while the communist parties in the world have been in moderate position and supported the Allies’ victory, had changed their attitudes after the war (Office of the Historian, 1945). Moreover, although the Communist International was officially dissolved in June 1943 this was just an illusion to promote better relations between the Allies. In fact, Comintern’s activities has continued and in 1947 it was officially replaced by Cominform. The Soviets have started to be active on a larger scale” (Office of the Historian, 1945). George Kennan, from the US Embassy in Moscow has sent the “Long Telegram” on February 22, 1946, alerting George Marshall, the Secretary of State, on ideological and security problems posed by the Soviet Union) Krieger, 1993). These two texts mainly provided justification for the new anti-Soviet policy of the US. For the US with its support to the “free world”, they could stop the Soviet’s expansionist aims

and form a liberal, economic and political world order. Also, the US claim was that it had the moral duty to fight against communism (Leche, 1966). After claiming to secure the “free world”, the United States has created military, economic and political organizations in Europe. After the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the US has created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 to contain the Soviet Union (Sander, 1979). The Truman Doctrine was declared on March 12, 1947 and it was a political support program to Greece and Turkey (Fleming, 1961).

In 1949, two important events alarmed the United States. The first one was the Soviet success of making an atomic bomb and the second was the communist success in China and its alliance treaty with the Soviets in 1950 (Morgenthau, 1958). The National Security Council Document no. 68 (NSC-68) was produced after the increasing tension and it was perceived as the most critical decision paper of the early days of the Cold War. The National Security Council has believed that the Soviet Union planned to dominate the world. In order to stop this, the US had to increase its defense expenditure (Gaddis, 1982). In the struggle against the Soviet Union NATO would be the main instrument in preserving the security of Europe (Gönlübol, 1975). Of course, this policy had direct reflections in the Middle East.

Implementing the US Policies in the Middle East

The US foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean was firstly designed by strengthening a defense line in Turkey and Greece (Karpat, 1975). For the US, Turkey had a unique position in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean. The defense was also based on string of military bases and a sophisticated network of intelligence gathering devices located near the Soviet border. In 1952, NATO accepted the membership of Greece and Turkey for the security concerns although they were not seen as “democratic” countries. As a result, with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid, a massive quantity of American aid poured into Greece and Turkey (Coulombis, 1983).¹

During that period, the Middle East, due to its oil resources, became an important investment region for the US. From 1938 to 1963 oil production in the Middle East has increased dramatically from an annual 6 million to 163 million tons and Europe has relied heavily on this supply. Of course, since the first involvement

¹ See also, Meyer, William H., *American Interests and the Crisis in Cyprus: A Human Rights Perspective*, The Cyprus Review, Vol. 5, No. I, 1993, p. 10; Mehmet Gönlübol, NATO, USA and Turkey, Kemal H. Karpat (ed), *Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition (1950-1974)*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1975, pp. 36-37.

of the US in the region its oil companies also had major interests in the Middle East (Combs, 1986). However, with the change in the Soviet foreign policy after the death of Stalin in 1953, the US policy of containing the SU seemed to be damaged. Now, the Soviets could penetrate to the Middle East by creating better relations with nationalist forces which stood against the West (Kennedy-Pipe, 2007).

Until 1952, security of the Eastern Mediterranean region was primarily a British responsibility. This view was no longer valid by July 1953, when the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles paid a trip to the region. It was realized that the policies of Britain and France in the region were damaging US interests. From then on, while maintaining Anglo-American co-operation to the greatest practicable extent, the United States had to be prepared to act either with local powers, Turkey in particular, or on its own. After the failure of the projected Turkey-Egypt alliance, the “Northern Tier” - comprising Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan - had grasped Dulles’ imagination as “the best defense arrangement against the Soviet expansionism” (Stefanidis, 1999). In the case of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, the US accepted merely an observer status although it agreed to provide regular support.

The more direct involvement of the US to the Middle East was after the Soviet penetration to the region. The US believed that Soviet Union connection with Egypt, Iraq, and Syria would increase the influence of Moscow in the Middle East because of their anti-West stance. The US was firstly disturbed when Egypt bought arms from Czechoslovakia in 1955. When the US has blocked Nasser’s attempts to raise money for building of the Aswan dam in 1956, he nationalized the Suez Canal (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1956). The agreed attack of Israel, France and Britain towards Egypt surprisingly was seen as dangerous and might have endangered the Western interests in the Middle East. Consequently, it was the United States that stopped Israel, France and UK but Nasser was the beneficiary as he became a hero in the Arab world because of the retreat of the enemies. The “victory” of Nasser was also seen as the success of Arab socialist-nationalism in the region. In this context, the Soviet Union has considered Nasser as one of the major leaders. Clearly, after the Soviet connection with the Middle East the region became an arena of conflict where the tension has increased during the Cold War.

Israel as an obstacle for the US policy

During this period, a major objective of the US was to block “Soviet expansionism”. However, the US had to add more objectives to the major one. These were maintaining the US and Western access to the Middle Eastern oil; ensuring the

security of Israel, and achieving an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Clearly, these objectives were conflicting because of the US' special relationship with Israel (Brands, 1994). For many years, the US was perceived as the center of progress and democracy by the Middle Easterners. The establishment of Israel in 1948 however was the beginning of difficult period for the US. This was because of Israel's national status in Arab eyes. For every Arab after 1948, the US became both an external and internal actor in the Middle East, on the one hand as a global superpower, and on the other hand as a local force due to its support for Israel. In both respects the US was seen in Arab eyes as an alien element despite longstanding friendship in cultural and economic fields (Pranger, 1998). In these circumstances, the goal of United States was to mediate and settle the conflict between the Arab states and Israel. The US tried carefully not to stress the containment of the Soviets because where the United States perceived the Soviet Union as the main enemy, the Arabs used to see Israel as their enemy (Kemp and Havkavy, 1997).

Changing Attitudes of the US during the Wars between Israel and Arabs

One of the effects of the Marshall Plan in the 1950s was to accelerate Europe's shift from coal to oil as the major energy source (Jones, 1996.) As a consequence, the Europeans became more dependent on the Middle East. As the leader of the Western World, therefore, the US had to maintain the Western access to Middle Eastern oil (Curtis, 1995).

The Suez Crisis in October 1956 openly showed the different perceptions concerning Middle East politics. When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal the United Kingdom and France coordinated their plan with Israel and entered to war against Nasser (Curtis, 1995). The United Kingdom declared that they were at war with Egypt because protecting the Suez Canal was the interest of the West (Kürkçüoğlu, 1972). The United States did not agree with its allies and with the Soviet Union they sponsored a cease-fire resolution in the UN Security Council. However, France and Great Britain vetoed the measures (Kürkçüoğlu, 1972). Eisenhower, who was in the heat of a re-election campaign, blasted the British and French over the radio and television for endangering peace in the Middle East by pulling in the Soviet Union (Kissinger, 1995).² The US acted in this way not to alienate itself from the Middle East.

² Kissinger explains conflicting attitudes of the US, UK, and France, during the Suez Crisis. For more info, please see Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York, etc. (Touchstone-Simon & Schuster, 1995,

The US stopped the action of the UK and France to prevent the Soviet involvement to the region. Nevertheless, this was not enough and the US had to declare the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, which was directly related to the Middle East to prevent the Soviet penetration (Sander, 1979). President Dwight Eisenhower announced that the “existing vacuum in the Middle East” [...] “must be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia.” The Doctrine gave full authority to the American President to use military power, and to protect the territorial integrity and independence of those countries which were under the threat of communism (Eisenhower, 1965). During 1950s the Soviet’s aim to spread its influence through radical nationalist states was successful and the US could not stop the Soviets penetrating to the Middle East.

During the Suez Crisis the Soviets also sought to benefit from the widening rift between the Western allies by suggesting a plan for a joint military action with the US. Nevertheless, the US refused the joint military action (Jones, 1996).³ Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev threatened France and Great Britain publicly with a nuclear strike, Eisenhower with economic sanctions. The combined pressure of them in the UN finally forced the allies to agree on a cease-fire. Resolution of the Suez Canal crisis did not solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. It only temporarily altered the military balance in the area. The war also increased Arab hostility towards Israel and Nasser began to successfully promote the concept of Arab nationalism (Daviş, 2004). By accepting Soviet-bloc weapons Nasser had invited the Soviets into the region. The US officials distrusted Nasser more than ever now that he was cultivating relations with the Kremlin. The anti-Soviet American policy in the Middle East also became now effectively anti-Nasser (Schoenberger and Reich, 1975). Since 1947 the US had built up a dam to prevent the Soviet entry to the region but now it had to deal with the Arab-Israel problem, which weakened its position.

After the World War II, the United States designed its policy to stop communism. The US claimed that Moscow was the center of communism and developed a strategy to contain the SU inside its borders. According to this policy the US could not cooperate with the SU in any issue. However, the US and the SU had to collaborate in the United Nations for a ceasefire between Israel and Egypt

pp. 522-549).

³ The conflict between the US and her allies Britain and France alarmed NATO. There, the US proposed that the problems of allies would be solved peacefully by negotiations not arms. The Consultation Process, Available: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-407CA32E_9A713F23/natolive/topics_49187.htm [Pointed 5.2.2010].

because of different reasons; the SU for penetrating to the Middle East and the US not to alienate itself from the Arab world.

The Middle East remained unstable after the Suez Crisis and Syria began to ask Egyptian support in the name of Arab nationalism when Israel's preventive attacks started (Brands, 1994). As the hero of Arab nationalism, Nasser could not ignore the request and his action to Sinai in May 14, 1967, was considered as *casus belli* by Israel (Hourani, 1997). President Johnson firstly wrote a letter both to Israeli and Egyptian leaders and then sent Robert Anderson as a secret envoy to Cairo on June 2, 1967. In the meeting, Nasser tried to influence Anderson. He stressed that despite Egypt's connection with the Soviets she was not a supporter of communism and desired closed relations with the US. However, he was critical on the United States foreign policy for being influenced by the Jewish lobby. Johnson's letter to Nasser asserted friendly feelings toward Arab people and offered the US support for new efforts in solving the problems in the Middle East (Office of the Historian, 1957). The US with this message aimed the continuation of the relations with the Arab world. His message to Israel however, was to avoid any action on its side against the Arabs (Office of the Historian, 1957). Here, the US was trying to secure Israel on the international platform under heavy criticism.

These efforts have shown the US will to get honest broker position in the conflict. Consequently, the US initiative failed and Israel decided to strike first. In June 5 Israel army attacked Egypt and Syria and defeated their armed forces. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States intervened. After the war the Arabs put oil embargo on the US and UK because of their assistance to Israel (Office of the Historian, 1967). However, the Arabs continued the embargo for a limited period only. For the rest of 1967, the American officials were busy trying to find a way to ease the tension. On November 22, 1967, the United States voted with other members of the Security Council for Resolution 242 which aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East. Now the US had the honest broker position that it would like.

During the Suez Crisis in 1956 the US tried to have a balanced policy towards Egypt not to alienate itself in the eyes of the Arabs. In 1966 however it began to increase military support to Israel. The US aimed to help Israel to defeat Egypt and Syria militarily because they were seen as the threat for the national interests of the US. Cheryl Rubenberg explains the reasons as such: The defeat of Egypt and Syria would lead to a loss of prestige and power of Nasser and the Baath regime. Syria and Egypt were two states that received arms from the Soviet Union and their defeat

would also mean a loss of prestige for the Soviet Union. Shortly, Israel was a useful vehicle for US to spread its hegemony in the region (Achcar, 2004).

Richard Nixon was elected as the new US president in November 1968. During Nixon's presidency détente has become the new look of the US foreign affairs and problems. The US officials believed that there was a growing interdependence of nations and they had to behave accordingly. The US also realized that nationalism could work for or against its interests. This was important because the US would not see all nationalist states as the US enemy because there were conscious attempts to stake out independent policies for the sake of national identity. The second factor was the evolution of the US relationship with the Soviet Union. The new consideration of the US officials on the Soviets made it possible to "identify common interests" and create some sort of "rules of behavior through dialogue and experience with the nuclear deterrence (Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976). The US responded to these developments in February 1970. Nixon sent a report to the US Congress and aimed to have partnership with the SU and to share responsibility with the allies. The UD in one hand developed the Nixon Doctrine in security matters on the other hand moved "from confrontation to negotiations" in the foreign policy. Finally, the US and SU were successful to sign "the nuclear non-proliferation treaty" and to start the SALT talks. Also, Nixon Doctrine "looked at local proxies" to guarantee the US security. The ideology-dominated US now was more pragmatic and have considered the détente as a determinant in the foreign affairs with the SU (Office of the Historian, 1974).⁴

In the case of the Soviets, Washington was comfortable because - as Secretary Rogers has also expressed - in the broader context, the Soviets were busy with "more immediate problems such as China, Eastern and Central Europe, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and their own economic problems" (Rogers, 1970). Rogers was right to see the Kremlin inclining "more toward caution and defensiveness than adventurism."

Egypt and Syria started the war with Israel on October 6, 1973. President Nixon warned Israel not to strike first; otherwise Israel could not rely on US help during the war (Yapp, 1996). During the first phase of the October War (Yom Kippur War), the Israelis suffered unexpected setbacks (Brands, 1994). The October War brought the two superpowers to the brink of military confrontation. Again, regional

⁴ Kissinger also confirms the official documents that the US also like the SU applied détente policy in the Middle East, for more info please see the link: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v15/d181>.

conflict and international relations were closely intertwined in the Middle East (Pranger, 1998). While Israel got US military assistance the Soviets sent military aid to Egypt (Jones, 1996). Finally, when Israel advanced, the Soviets backed Egypt declaring to enter to the war in its side. When the US put the American troops in alert, both sides understood the seriousness of their actions and turned back to act within the spirit of détente. The US-SU sponsored jointly for the resolution demanding a cease-fire.

Neither Israel nor Egypt advanced in any area but the US was beneficiary. Clearly, the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's concern was to secure not only the balance in the world but also to secure the balance in the Middle East. Consequently, the US viewed that the continuation of the situation would turned to a crisis which would more humiliate Egypt; a position that might open again the way to a Soviet involvement. While the Arabs perceived Egyptian President Anwar Sadat as a nationalist hero, prestigious Egypt would become a useful ally for the US. This situation gave opportunity for the US to be an honest broker between Arabs and Israel and suitable ground for creating *Pax Americana* in the Middle East (Achcar, 2004). The US successfully avoided a further defeat and humiliation of the Arabs and gained the position of an honest broker in the peace negotiations.

The US long-standing policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict was formed by Kissinger during the hotperiod of the 1973 War. After the cease-fire between the parties, the US became the major go-between in the dispute. Now, the Soviets began to be evicted the Middle East. The Arabs and Israel is met in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations in December 1973. This was the first meeting that Arabs and Israel is came to table aiming to solve their problems. However, none of the sides would like to see the Soviet representatives to participate to the meetings (Schulzinger, 1998). When the Soviets lost power in the region, the US increased its power dramatically. The US policy was problematic in the Middle East for decades because it was not easy to support Israel and to find friends simultaneously among the radical Arab states. The US policy in general was based on friendly relations with conservative Arab states. At the same time however, the US tried to convince radical Arab countries that they could not get enough assistance from the SU to reach their national goals. The years of 1973 and 1974 showed that American policy was successful especially in Egypt. Egypt put an end to the Soviet presence and invited the US in. This was a great victory for the US policy against the Soviet Union.

The systemic changes determined the actions of the Soviet Union during that period. While the SU acted according to the systemic changes in the region, the US

saw the Middle East as a test-case of Soviet intentions. The result of the test turned positive with détente and the rules of the Cold War settled. According to the rules the superpowers would act unrestricted in their own sphere of interest but would not involve in the other sides issues respectively. Finally, the Soviet Union has to accept the Middle East as the area belonging to the United States sphere of interest.

New Cold War in the Middle East!

There have been many discussions that the “new Cold War” has been started between the Sino-Russia alliance and the US (Stavridis, 2016). Clearly, with the Cold War paradigms we cannot explain all the other great power confrontations. Thus, the new confrontation between two sides cannot be understood as being ideological rivalry between capitalist/revisionist states. Among the other issues the Cold War was clashes of ideologies between the SU and the US (Kennedy-Pipe, 2007). Keeping this in the mind it will be useful to consider some of events of the Cold War and compare them with the contemporary ones.

The US declared the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 to confront the Soviet Union. After 9/11 attacks the US declared Bush Doctrine to confront the global “terror”. In both cases the US has supported its doctrines by massive propaganda campaigns against the enemies, i.e. the SU and terrorism. However, although the US is the major power in the international system, again a rival power, the Russian Federation is penetrating to the Middle East giving the sense that it is replacing the Soviet Union (Korybko, 2015).

When the United States announced the Nixon Doctrine it aimed to share responsibilities and difficulties with its allies towards the SU. Yet, the United States faced difficulties in implementing Nixon Doctrine because of the attitudes of the members of the Western alliance. While the United States thought more globally its allies were mainly concerned about their own interests. In 1956 the US goal was to contain SU; however, Britain was mainly concerned about its interests, as in the case of the Suez Crisis. On the same way, there are strained relations between Ankara and Washington in the region nowadays in the implementation of the US foreign policy (İdiz, 2016).

In its fight against nationalist powers the US was successful in the Cold War period. The nationalist government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran was toppled in 1953 by the Western intervention, giving the Shias to place themselves against Shah and then lead Iran which was one of the rivals of the US in the region. Also,

the defeat of Nasser's armies in 1967 marked the second failure of the nationalist experiment. Although Nasser's successor Anwar Sadat brought Egypt into Washington's camp, one of the consequences of defeating nationalism was the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. Recently, the invasion of Iraq by US leading coalition in 2003 and the civil war in Syria gave room to the radical Islamic groups even to form "a state" in the Middle East.

Putting aside, but not forgetting, the sins of the European great powers, today the US is cooperative with the rival powers in order to ease the problems in the Middle East. The US collaborated with the Soviet Union in the United Nations platform to stop the Suez crisis and recently it worked with Russia and the Western powers to control Iran's nuclear program. Now the US is working with Russia to stop radical Islamic fighters in the region, especially in Syria (Abc News, 2016). Moreover, the US is coordinating the diplomatic efforts in Syria with Russia.

After the election of Donald Trump to presidency there have been many views that expected a retreat from the traditional policy of United States. As it is explained above during the Cold War period the US foreign policy was based on to maintain the Western access to Middle Eastern oil, ensuring the security of Israel, and achieving an Arab-Israeli peace settlement in order to secure its hegemony in the region. There is no indication that the US would like to change the main points of its policies. The US is trying to maintain unrestricted access of the West to the energy sources of the Middle East. The US and Israel have become even closer with the Trump administration. Beyond this, Trump administration announced its intention for a regime change in Iran which is the main enemy of Israel in the region. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson declared that the US is relying on "elements inside of Iran" to change the rule in Iran (Varkiani, 2017). The speech of Tillerson reminds the CIA coup in Iran in 1950s.

Conclusion

After the United States came out from the Cold War as the winner and world became unipolar where the US acted as the World Police. After the Cold War, the United States has sought an enemy in order to claim the leadership of the West. The events of 9/11 gave an opportunity to the US and replaced the Cold War arguments over communism with terrorism and the states supporting the terrorists. Radical Islam and jihadism became the enemies as they constitute a threat against the "free world". Today, the US continues its efforts to bring the Middle East countries into the liberal economic system as it did, to some length, in the case of Russia after the

Cold War. The US policy in general has been based on friendly relations with conservative Arab states. Today, same policy continues and the US tries to fragment the unity of “radical” states to secure its sphere of interests as it happened in Iraq, Libya and then in Syria. Also, the US continues to be an honest broker between conflicting parties although in some cases it was the real producer of the problems.

The rhetoric of the United States policies was based on democracy and liberalism during the Cold War period. This rhetoric has not changed in the post-Cold War era, although the United States continues to apply power politics in the world in order to secure its national interests in reality.

The US claims to change its foreign policy priorities in the post- Cold War era. However, there are more similarities than differences in the US foreign policy. As a result, we can claim that continuity rather than change characterizes the foreign policy in the post- Cold War era.

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