

WHY DO BUREAUCRATS PUSH FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM? PROPOSING A MODEL OF BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

Bureaucrats are usually portrayed as the firmest resisters against change. As a very visible exception to this tendency, Provincial Governor Mr. Recep Yazicioglu (1948- 2003) had long been considered a very vocal advocate for administrative reform in Turkey. For the last three decades, he criticized the excessive centralization, ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and unresponsiveness problems that plague the Turkish public bureaucracy. By using literature review, archival search and in-depth semi-structured interview methods, this study examines Governor Yazicioglu's life, career, accomplishments, and evaluates the applicability of the concepts of "exemplary public administrator" (Cooper and Wright, 1992), "public service motivation" (Perry and Wise, 1990) and "exit, voice and loyalty" (Hirschman, 1970) in a non-U.S. setting. It is concluded that these concepts can be useful in explaining exemplary bureaucratic behavior in the Turkish bureaucracy when they are combined with several additional explanatory factors (i.e. political environment, positive examples, amount of risk of being a critic, longevity of criticism, providing successful examples of implementation, support of the media, and support of citizens) within a proposed behavioral model that is applicable internationally.

Keywords: *Administrative reform, bureaucratic behavior, exemplary public administrators*

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ÖZET

Bürokratlar genellikle değişime karşı sert direnişçiler olarak betimlenirler. Bu yönetime çok görünür bir örnek, uzun süre yönetim reformu konusundaki görüşlerini yüksek sesle dile getiren Vali Recep Yazıcıoğlu'dur (1948-2003). Yazıcıoğlu, yaşamının son otuz yılında Türk kamu bürokrasisinin temel sorunları olan aşırı merkezîyetçiliği, etkin ve etkili hizmet verilememesini, yönetilenlerden gelen isteklere bürokrasinin duyarsızlığını eleştirmiştir. Bu çalışmada alan yazını taraması, arşiv analizi ve açık uçlu soruların sorulduğu yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakat yöntemleri kullanılarak Vali Yazıcıoğlu'nun hayatı ve çalışmaları incelenmiştir. Bu incelemede, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri kamu ve işletme yönetimi alan yazınlarında üretilen "örnek kamu yöneticileri" (Cooper ve Wright, 1992), "kamu hizmeti güdülenmesi" (Perry ve Wise, 1990) ile "terk, itiraz ve itaat" (Hirschman, 1970) kavramları incelenen konunun çözümlenmesinde anlamlı bir katkı yapmışlardır. Gerçekleştirilen analizde bu kavramlara ek olarak, bazı başka değişkenler de (siyasal çevre, olumlu örnekler, eleştirel olmanın riski, eleştirinin süresi, başarılı uygulama örnekleri vermek, basın ve vatandaş desteği, vb.) kullanılmıştır. Yapılan analizin sonunda yönetim reformunun savunan bürokratları güdüleyen etmenler konusunda başka ülkelerdeki örnek olaylara da uygulanabilecek bir davranışsal model önerilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Yönetmel reform, bürokratik davranış, örnek kamu yöneticil*

1. Introduction

Rainey and Wise (1999, p. 127) argue that bureaucrats have been stereotyped as the firmest resisters of change, and the politicians defend their reform agendas as efforts to stimulate this change-resistant public bureaucracy. However, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999, p. 1-2) argue that this may not necessarily be the case. Public organizations may well be what they call as "galloping elephants". An elephant is a large and cumbersome being. Yet, it can run fast and it is quite sensitive to the changes in its environment. Similarly, the public organizations and bureaucrats may well be sensitive and adaptive to their changing environment. Rainey and Wise (p. 127), for example, argue that we do not have clear evidence of the alleged resistance to change by the public organizations and bureaucrats. They also emphasize the importance of the international perspective in understanding the dynamics of change processes although there may be differences because of different cultures and political institutions. Rainey and Wise contend that the patterns of variation and commonality may present significant learning opportunities from both theoretical and practical viewpoints. This article presents a case study from Turkey in order to benefit from an international perspective, and understand the nature and development of the demands for administrative change among bureaucrats.

Bureaucrats in Turkey are not famous for their eccentric behaviors. That is exactly why it was always interesting for Turkish media correspondents to follow the

Provincial Governor,¹ Mr. Recep Yazicioglu, while he water-skied, climbed trees to eat fruits (Ozdemir, 1999), or rafted through wild rivers. It is ironic that Governor Yazicioglu's unconventional and 'unstatesmanly' behaviors attracted more media and thus public attention than his decades-long and very serious criticisms against the excessive centralization, ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and unresponsiveness of the Turkish administrative system, or his successful efforts for local social and economic development. Such misplaced attention may shape Governor Yazicioglu's legacy as an eccentric bureaucrat, rather than that of a reform advocate and a civic educator that he really was.

The study is not meant to be an elegy to the governor. On the contrary, it both examines his flaws such as being an authoritarian but paternalist bureaucrat at times, and his life, career, accomplishments and qualities as a moral exemplar in the Turkish public administration system. The objective is to document the motivations of a bureaucrat who risks his career by vocally demanding administrative and political change, a situation and a behavioral model which have comparative and global applications.

2. Methodology

The research of this study will be directed to answering this question: "what are the factors that motivate a bureaucrat to do what he/she believes is right (in this case, demanding administrative and political change) despite the risk of punishment by his/her superiors for such actions?". By using literature review, archival search and in-depth semi-structured interview methods, this study suggest a model that tests the applicability of the concepts of "*exemplary public administrator*" (Cooper and Wright, 1992), "*public service motivation*" (Perry and Wise, 1990) and "*exit, voice and loyalty*" (Hirschman, 1970) in a non-U.S. setting. The literature review and archival search of newspaper articles about the governor are used to prepare the questions, which were asked to Governor Yazicioglu during the interview, eight months before his death after a traffic accident. The list of interview questions is presented in the Appendix.

¹ Turkey is a unitary state. (Provincial) Governors (*vali*) in Turkey are not elected like their counterparts in the U.S. Instead, they are appointed by the central government in Ankara. A provincial governor is the highest-level appointed civil servant (administrative agent of the central government) in a province. Still, this position is not a career civil servant position. Rather, it is an "exceptional" bureaucratic position; it has a political dimension to it as well.

3. Theoretical Constructs

Three theoretical constructs are used for analyzing Mr. Yazicioglu's behavior: The first and the main theoretical construct of this study is the concept of 'exemplary public administrator' by Cooper and Wright (1992). In the same book, Hart (1992) argues that there exists a paradox in public opinion, which is signaled by a confidence in the institutions, but a lack of confidence in the leaders of those institutions (p. 9). Hart contends that the American society no longer sees visible exemplars of moral courage, fidelity and trustworthiness (p. 10). The existence and visibility of these moral exemplars, however, are very critical, since they provide us with standards and inspiration: they represent the ideals of a society (p. 13). Hart underlines the moral context of the exemplary public administrators (p. 21-27). He divides the incidences of moral exemplars into two categories according to the longevity of the exemplary behavior, and the amount of risk born by the exemplar: Moral episodes are the brief instances of moral and exemplary behavior, while moral processes are extended periods. In other words, having a moral process is engaging in the exemplary behavior as a way of life.

In addition to this theoretical background, Cooper and Wright examined the cases of eleven American bureaucrats, who they believed performed moral and exemplary behavior. A similar effort to reflect the lives of civil servants had been undertaken by Lasson (1978). In his book, *Private Lives of Public Servants*, Lasson tells the stories of six civil servants, who do their job diligently and competently against all odds. These people implement the policies as best as they could often against their will, conscience and/or common sense (p. x).

There are two other theoretical constructs that play a secondary role in presenting the case of Mr. Yazicioglu as a moral exemplar. The first of these concepts is the "public service motivation". Different forms of this concept have been expressed in the public administration literature for a long time. Buchanan's (1975) study of public service ethics in which he explored the differences between public and private sector employees, was followed by the review and development of his findings by Rainey (1982), Wittmer (1991) and Gabris & Simo (1995). Frederickson and Hart's (1985) "patriotism of benevolence" concept, which included benevolent impulses and behaviors toward a broader community, such as a nation, and protecting the basic rights and freedoms of the citizens, and Frederickson's (1997) treatment of ethical and equitable behaviors as central themes of public administration are reflections of a similar idea.

Perry and Wise developed and refined the concept of public service motivation by defining a public service motive as “*an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations*” (1990, p. 368). These motives may fall into three different categories: rational, norm-based and affective. Rational motives involve actions grounded in individual utility maximization. Norm-based motives refer to actions generated by efforts to conform to norms and desires to serve the public interest. Affective motives refer to triggers of behavior that are grounded in emotional responses to various social contexts, a desire and willingness to help others. It should be noted that these categories often overlap.

The existence of public service motivation is analyzed by various empirical studies (Crewson, 1997; Brewer, Selden & Facer II, 2000). These studies concluded that public service motivation does exist, but they differed in their answers in regard to the question of measurement. As an answer to the problem of measurement, Perry (1996) presented a scale to measure public service motivation of U.S. federal government employees. The scale is the conceptual link of six dimensions: attraction to policy-making, commitment to the public interest, civic duty, social justice, self-sacrifice and compassion. Perry assessed the reliability and validity of this scale by conducting a survey and employing confirmatory factor analysis. Perry (1997) also investigated the concept’s relationship to various sets of correlates, such as parental socialization, religious socialization, professional identification and political ideology.

The third theoretical construct used in this article is the “*Voice, Exit or Loyalty*” concept of Hirschman (1970). Risking oversimplification, Hirschman argues that when an individual faces a problem in his/her organization, he/she has three main options. First, he/she can be “loyal” to the organization and silence his/her own dissent. Secondly, he/she can voice the problem, and deal with it within the organizational boundaries. There is a certain amount of risk involved in the “voice option”. For example, being a dissident may endanger one’s chances of promotion. The third and last option for the individual is to leave the organization (exit). The “neglect” dimension is later added to this model (Rosbutt, Faitell, Rogers & Mainous, 1988; Lyons & Lowery, 1989). The way that this construct applies to Governor Yazıcıoğlu’s case will be explained in detail in the following sections.

4. The Main Features of Socio-Political and Administrative Culture in Turkey: Some Clues for Exceptional Behaviour of Governor Yazıcıoğlu

Since public service ethics is concerned with the values and attitudes/behavior of bureaucrats, ethical problems of public administration should be analyzed not only

in a legal-administrative context but also within a cultural context (Emre, Hazama and Mutlu, 2003). Most of the authors on the issue of public service ethics advise considering cultural relativity when searching ethical/unethical issues, particularly in non-Western settings (for example, see Kernaghan and Dwivedi, 1983; Khassawneh, 1989; Cooper, 1990; and Emre, Hazama and Mutlu, 2003). Therefore, analysing some features of the Turkish socio-political and administrative culture is helpful to understand the ethical concerns/attitudes of Turkish bureaucrats (Omurgonulsen and Oktem, 2005)

Recent research on the cultural base of the values in the Turkish bureaucracy (Emre, 1993; and Özen, 1996) have provided us an opportunity to make an assessment on this issue. The results of these researches show that the significant element of Turkish administrative culture is “collectivism, solidarity and harmony” in “community” or “groups”. The literature on the Turkish culture also supports this finding (Ergun, 1991; and Güvenç, 1993). In contrast to the “individualistic” culture, the special characteristics of the “collectivist” culture are: “loyalty” to his/her own community, “solidarity” and “harmony” with the other members of the community, and “individual irresponsibility”. In a collectivist culture, the community (i.e. family in the broader sense, friendship groups, membership of a profession or a government department) is responsible for taking care of individuals and community leaders have an extraordinary prestige in communities concerned (Emre, 1993: 136-137). Like ordinary Turkish people, the Turkish bureaucrats feel secure only in a community. They try to develop good interpersonal relations in the community (i.e. the public bureaucracy) in order to survive in the political and bureaucratic arena. The guardianship for group interests is also the easiest way to get beneficial posts in the bureaucracy. The extraordinary prestige of political and bureaucratic elite and their poor personal responsibility within this collectivist culture also facilitate the expansion of unethical conducts in public administration (Emre, Hazama and Mutlu, 2003: 450-451).

The “unquestionable state” is also a strong cultural value, which is a negative aspect of the bureaucratic ruling tradition (Heper, 1987), in Turkey. This is the main obstacle to the transparency and accountability of the government. “Protecting the interests of the State” is regarded as one of the official duties of bureaucrats. Every kind of activity that is done in the name of protecting the interests of the State, even if it is a crime or offence, might be seen, not legally, but morally right. Also, some other cultural values encourage the concealment of crimes or offences committed in the name of the State. A Turkish proverb clearly defines the collectivist mentality of the Turkish people in this manner: “A broken arm should remain inside the sleeve” (“*Kol*

kırılır yen içinde kalır”). It means “*you should not wash your dirty linen in public*” (Emre, Hazama and Mutlu, 2003: 451-452). Such an understanding supports “loyalty” rather than the “voice” option. Thus, Governor Yazıcıoğlu, with his attitudes/behavior identified with the voice option in many crucial issues of the Turkish public administration, is an exceptional case in the recent history of the Turkish public administration.

5. Recep Yazicioglu’s Life and Career: Factors that Shape an Exemplar

Recep Yazicioglu was born to a family of bureaucrats in Trabzon,² Turkey, in 1948. His father, a high-level religious bureaucrat,³ was a man who had a unique reputation in his private and professional life as a very honest, uncompromising and unconventional man. The Governor said that his father always inspired his sons to be great men; as he once said, “*I want Recep to be a Governor, and Sait to be head of the General Directorate of Religious Affairs*” (Personal communication, January 30, 2003). Governor Yazicioglu’s brother, Mr. Mustafa Sait Yazicioglu, indeed became the head of the General Directorate of Religious Affairs, and currently he is a deputy of the governing political party in the Turkish Parliament. For Governor Yazicioglu, his father became the first and foremost example in his personal and professional life that was beyond reproach (Personal communication, January 30, 2003).

Young Yazicioglu graduated from the esteemed Ankara University Faculty of Law in 1968, but never liked the legal profession (Personal communication, January 30, 2003).⁴ He began his civil service career (for a chronological summary of his career, activities, criticisms and suggestions, see Table 1 below) during the same year as an assistant to a district governor, which is a compulsory internship period prior to

² The city of Trabzon is in the Eastern Black Sea Region. This is a mountaneous region, with a wonderful natural background, and an almost continual rainy climate. It should be noted that the people of this region are known for their impulsive behaviors and love of nature. As explained later in the article, Mr. Yazicioglu had shown a typical “Black Sea personality” throughout his life.

³ A word about the state-religion relationship in Turkey seems to be in order at this point: Turkey follows the Ottoman style of practicing a kind of Caesaro-papism, rooted in the Byzantine Empire tradition; a system in which the state controls the clergy (Quataert, 2000, p. 4). Similar to the Ottoman sultans who were appointing the members of the religious establishment (*the ulema*), in the present day in the Republic of Turkey, a specific branch of the executive, the General Directorate of Religious Affairs, appoints and deals with the personnel affairs of all the religious bureaucrats, such as the preachers (*imam/vaiz*), most of whom work in the mosques.

⁴ During the interview, Yazicioglu did not give detailed reasons of his dislike.

a career, initially in a district,⁵ and then in a provincial governorship. Between 1971 and 1983, he worked as a district governor in various small towns. He became a provincial governor in 1983 during the first term of the liberal-conservative Motherland Party's⁶ rule (1983-1987). Looking back, many people criticized Yazicioglu as a Motherland Party's man, and criticized his promotion to the office of provincial governorship at the age of 35 as being premature. Later, when Yazicioglu publicly opposed the interventions of the politicians of the ruling party into the conduct and affairs of bureaucracy (Gulerce, 1998), he was accused of having double standards, since such political interventions allegedly helped him get promoted to provincial governorship (Sardan and Ozdemir, 1999).

Table 1: Chronological Summary of Recep Yazicioglu's Career, Activities, Criticisms and Suggestions

Time Period	Duty	Main Activities	Main Criticisms	Main Suggestions for Reform
February-September 2003	Governor of Denizli Province	-Administrative and Political Criticisms -Economic Development	- Unity of Powers in Government - Excessive Administrative Centralization	-Separation of Powers in Government -Presidential System
November 1999-January 2003	Inactive Position as Governor (Ankara)	-Emergency Management -Promotion of Tourism -Promotion of Sports and Healthy Living Habits -Organization of Campaigns against Tobacco and Alcohol Use	- Political Influences on Bureaucrats -Culture of Idleness -Corruption - Lack of Transparency in Government -Informal Economic Activities	-New Electoral System -Strengthening Local Governments -Decreasing Political Influences on Bureaucrats -Improving Civil Society
1991-1999	Governor of Erzincan Province			
1989- 1991	Governor of Aydin Province			

⁵ A district governor (*kaymakam*) is the highest-level appointed career civil servant in a district, which is a subsection of a province. New provincial governors are generally selected by government from a pool of successful district governors.

⁶ Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi, ANAP*) won the general elections twice and ruled Turkey from 1983 to 1991. They also took part in numerous coalition governments during the 1990s and early 2000s.

1984-1989	Governor of Tokat Province			
1971-1984	District Governor in Various Towns (Kalkandere, Bahçe, Hamur, Ayvacık, Kırıkhan, Alaca, Akçakoca, in chronological order)			
1968-1971	Assistant district governor (compulsory internship period) in Aydın Governor's Office			

Having served 17 years uninterruptedly as a provincial governor, he was removed from active duty⁷ in November 1999, after criticizing the Coalition Government of center-left, nationalist, and liberal parties led by Mr. Bulent Ecevit. Yazicioglu was specifically criticizing the practice of appointing former police chiefs as provincial governors as the sign of an undemocratic mentality (Saglam, 1999). Upon his removal from active duty, he joked about the unprecedented tolerance shown to his dissenting views: *"I am grateful to my state, which has put up with me for 32 years"* (**Turkish Daily News**, October 1, 1999).

Many people expected Yazicioglu to join politics after his removal from active duty. He, however, gave mixed signals about the possibility of a political career. He condemned the current practice of politics in Turkey and its influence on government bureaucracy, and emphasized the need for political reform. He wanted to be a candidate above petty party politics (Ozdemir, 1998). Yazicioglu criticized the authoritarian inner functioning (i.e. the iron law of oligarchy) of the

⁷ When a provincial governor is removed from active duty, he is asked to come back to the capital (Ankara) and stay in an office at the Ministry of Interior. The most likely reasons of a governor's removal from active duty are perceived ineffectiveness during his/her duty, or a political mismatch between the governor and the political party or parties in power. These inactive governors may serve as a pool of governor candidates (someone outside this pool can be named governor as well) when the government wants to reshuffle the governors. These inactive periods may continue for years for some governors, and some of them are retired from these inactive posts.

political parties in Turkey, calling them “religious orders”, in which absolute loyalty to the leader is the rule (**Zaman**, February 10, 1998).

He returned to active duty in February 2003 soon after the electoral victory of the conservative Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*). The conservative Justice and Development Party was influential in his last appointment (February-September 2003), as the Motherland Party had been in his first. When Yazicioglu’s career is examined in parallel with the political party or coalitions of parties in power, as in Table 2 below, it can be easily seen that it was the social-democrat dominated Coalition Government of the 1999-2003 time period, which removed him from active provincial governorship. In all other times, when the conservative parties were either ruling the country alone, or as the dominant force of a coalition government, Yazicioglu continued to work as a governor. This might also imply the significant effects of conservative (traditional moral and religious) values on public service ethics in Turkey (see Omurgonulsen and Oktem, 2005).⁸

Table 2: Yazicioglu’s Career Development and the Ruling Party or Coalition of the Period

Period	Government	Prime Minister	Coalition	Begins	Ends	Number of Days	Yazicioglu’s Position
30	I. Demirel Govt.	Süleyman Demirel		10.27.1965	11.3.1969	1.468	1968-1971 Assistant district governor (compulsory internship period) in Aydın Governor’s Office
31	II. Demirel Govt.	Süleyman Demirel		11.3.1969	03.06.1970	123	
32	III. Demirel Govt.	Süleyman Demirel		03.06.1970	03.26.1971	385	

⁸ It should also be pointed out that the conservative parties that supported Mr. Yazicioglu did not perform well in their bids to curb corruption in Turkey. Yazicioglu often voiced his concerns about the rampant corruption in the government, even when the Motherland Party was in power alone; that is, when his political support was in its peak. That was one reason of his choice for staying out of politics. Another conservative political party, the Justice and Development Party, which reappointed him to an active post as governor, again used an anti-corruption rhetoric in its political campaign in 2002. Yazicioglu died soon after its electoral victory. Since then, the Justice and Development Party could not satisfy the expectations in its war against corruption. If Yazicioglu had lived more to see all these, he most probably would have voiced his concern and dissatisfaction with the new political party in power, as well.

33	I. Erim Govt.	Nihat Erim	C	03.26.197 1	12.11.197 1	260	1971-1984 District Governor in Various Towns (Kalkandere, Bahçe, Hamur, Ayvacık, Kırkhan, Alaca, Akçakoca, in chronologica l order)	
34	II. Erim Govt.	Nihat Erim	C	12.11.197 1	05.22.197 2	163		
35	Melen Govt.	Ferit Melen	C	05.22.197 2	04.15.197 3	328		
36	Talu Govt.	Naim Talu	C	04.15.197 3	01.26.197 4	286		
37	I. Ecevit Govt.	Bülent Ecevit	C	01.26.197 4	11.17.197 4	295		
38	Irmak Govt.	Sadi Irmak	C	11.17.197 4	03.31.197 5	134		
39	IV. Demirel Govt.	Süleyman Demirel	C	03.31.197 5	06.21.197 7	813		
40	II. Ecevit Govt.	Bülent Ecevit		06.21.197 7	07.21.197 7	30		
41	V. Demirel Govt.	Süleyman Demirel	C	07.21.197 7	01.05.197 8	168		
42	III. Ecevit Govt.	Bülent Ecevit	C	01.05.197 8	11.12.197 9	676		
43	VI. Demirel Govt.	Süleyman Demirel		11.12.197 9	09.12.198 0	305		
44	Ulusü Govt.	Bülend Ulusü		09.20.198 0	12.13.198 3	1.179		
45	I. Özal Govt.	Turgut Özal		12.13.198 3	12.21.198 7	1.469		1984-1989 Governor of Tokat Province
46	II. Özal Govt.	Turgut Özal		12.21.198 7	11.09.198 9	689		
47	Akbulut Govt.	Yıldırım Akbulut		11.09.198 9	06.23.199 1	591	1989- 1991 Governor of Aydın Prov.	
48	I. Yılmaz Govt.	Mesut Yılmaz		06.23.199 1	11.20.199 1	150	1991-1999 Governor of Erzincan Province	
49	VII. Demirel Govt.	Süleyman Demirel	C	11.21.199 1	06.25.199 3	582		
50	I. Çiller Govt.	Tansu Çiller	C	06.25.199 3	10.05.199 5	832		
51	II. Çiller Govt.	Tansu Çiller		10.05.199 5	10.30.199 5	25		
52	III. Çiller Govt.	Tansu Çiller	C	10.30.199 5	03.06.199 6	128		
53	II. Yılmaz Govt.	Mesut Yılmaz	C	03.06.199 6	06.28.199 6	114		
54	Erbakan Govt.	Necmettin Erbakan	C	06.28.199 6	06.30.199 7	367		
55	III. Yılmaz Govt.	Mesut Yılmaz	C	06.30.199 7	01.11.199 9	560		
56	IV. Ecevit Govt.	Bülent Ecevit		01.11.199 9	05.28.199 9	137		
57	V. Ecevit Govt.	Bülent Ecevit	C	05.28.199 9	11.18.200 2	1.270		November 1999- January

							2003 Inactive Position as Governor (Ankara)
58	Gül Govt.	Abdullah Gül		11.18.200 2	03.14.200 3	116	January- September 2003 Governor of Denizli Province
59	Erdoğan Govt.	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan		03.14.200 3	02.22.200 5	1076	

While serving as the Governor of the Denizli Province in Southwestern Turkey, he was hospitalized after a serious traffic accident near Ankara on September 2, 2003. On September 4, doctors declared that his brain functions stopped. His heart stopped on September 8, 2003. His death caused great grief among Turkish people (Ortayli, 2003; Senyuz, 2003).

6. Yazicioglu as an Exemplar

It is the argument of this article that the life and career of Governor Yazicioglu in general, and his behavior of vocally demanding administrative and political change in Turkey in particular, can be explained by employing the three theoretical constructs summarized above. For example, Governor Yazicioglu's continuous criticisms of the administrative system over an extended period of time by risking his career exemplify the moral processes that Hart describes. Below is a detailed analysis of this construct.

The reasons for Governor Yazicioglu's unconventional attitude and behaviours and eventual removal from active duty might have had roots early in his life and career. From the very beginning of his career as a bureaucrat, Mr. Yazicioglu began to see the problems that had been plaguing the Turkish administrative system. Soon after the 1980 military intervention, while he was the District Governor of Alaca (a district of the Corum Province), he sent a letter to all the members of the recently formed Consultative Assembly (*Danışma Meclisi*), in which he tried to convince the members of the Assembly to enable the creation of a new local government authority, "the district" (*ilçe*), by adding a sentence to the new Constitution they were drafting (Personal communication, January 30, 2003). On another occasion, after returning from a trip where he was sent to examine and compare the German local government system with that of Turkey, he complained in person to the Minister of the Interior at that time that Turkey needs more decentralization. Such moves for a young district governor were very bold, especially

in a bureaucratic culture where conforming to the status-quo is the rule, therefore risky behaviour and initiative-taking is the bold exception. This early attempt is a perfect example of the use of the voice option in the “exit, voice and loyalty” construct of Hirshman (1970), explained above. Yazicioglu’s use of the voice option in this example was under the conditions of extreme power asymmetry (a young District Governor versus the Minister of the Interior), and thus of high risk for Turkey.

Yazicioglu also benefited from the exemplary behaviours of some of his contemporaries: The Mayor of Kalkandere (a small district of the Rize Province), where Yazicioglu first began his career as a district-governor, impressed him with his humbleness and accessibility. The sign on Mayor Ekrem Orhon’s door, Yazicioglu remembers, read “*Come in without knocking*”. He mimicked the Mayor’s open door policy throughout his career. Another person who shaped young Yazicioglu’s future behaviours was a colleague, Mr. Mehmet Can, who became the Minister of Justice during the Third Ecevit Government in 1978-1979. Mr Can influenced Yazicioglu greatly with his strong will to implement justice, regardless of the political realities of the situation at hand, equally to everyone, even to the extent of defying the power of local notables. Other than these two examples, Yazicioglu said that he had learned a lot from many bureaucrats that he worked with throughout his career (Personal communication, January 30, 2003).

Although he did not come from the political-administrative tradition of *Mekteb-i Mülkiye*.⁹ He was heavily influenced by the public service motivation of bureaucrats who graduated from this School. Despite this influence, continuously during his tenure, Governor Yazicioglu did not refrain from criticizing the highly centralized administrative system, the inefficiency such a system causes in Turkey. For example, he said that bureaucrats in Ankara decide on standard construction plans for huge government buildings such as administrative buildings, schools and hospitals. He argued that such technical decisions can be best made at local level after assessing local needs. He underlined the necessity of transformation to a more decentralized system. Decentralization, he argued, would have given more political, social and economic powers to localities, which in turn may better use these powers than the central government (Personal communication, January 30, 2003).

⁹ The Ottoman bureaucracy school which was transformed into the Faculty of Political Sciences/*Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi* of Ankara University in the Republican period.

Yazicioglu also disapproved the heavy influence of politicians on civil servants. He argued that such an influence endangers the effective, efficient, and just functioning of the bureaucracy. One remedy for the better functioning of bureaucracy, he continued, is to encourage civil societal development, to increase the transparency of government operations and the accountability of public servants. He wanted to change the role of the citizenry in the Turkish administration from a passive spectator to an active participant. He believed that unless the citizens share the responsibility and the risk, they will not be a real participant in government activities and they will not be able to reform the administrative system (Personal communication, January 30, 2003). During the mid and late 1990's, he extended his repertoire of criticisms by opposing the practice of appointing high-level police officers to the positions of high-level civil service such as provincial governorship. He thought that such appointments might create an authoritarian political environment for the Turkish democracy in general, and the Turkish Civil Service in particular (Saglam, 1999).

6.1 Recep Yazicioglu's Strategies

The most important strategy of Yazicioglu to push for reform was his mastery of using the media to transmit his messages to the Turkish people. He understood very well that successful use (or manipulation) of the media is a key asset for a reform preacher (Zaman, February 1, 1997). Colleagues accused him of being a media showman. But he argued that the wide publicity that his unconventional behaviors brought was the only effective way of making people listen to what is wrong with the administrative system, (read "country") and what needs to be done about it. For example, he was criticized that he was indulging himself with rafting, water skiing and similar activities when he was the governor of the Erzincan Province in Eastern Turkey, a relatively economically and socially undeveloped area, experiencing Kurdish separatist terrorist activities at the time. He answered his critics by saying that he was conducting psychological warfare with terrorism and underdevelopment by associating Erzincan with something other than terrorism and poverty (Personal communication, January 30, 2003).

Another important difference of Yazicioglu from other people who criticize the administrative system was his ability to back his criticisms up with successful demonstrations of the alternative means of public service delivery. In other words, the positive results of his practices successfully supported his suggestion for reform. He thought it was his success in practicing what he preached within the provinces he worked in that stopped his adversaries to have him removed from active duty earlier.

My criticisms and the presentation of workable alternatives/ solutions to the problems can be observed simultaneously throughout my career. The way I present solutions is to make the citizens active participants in administrative decisions and their execution. They will pay [partially] for the services and follow up on the money that they contribute. Because, only if they pay [part of the price] for the service, citizens will follow up the results. This is called auto-control (Personal communication, January 30, 2003).

6.2 Recep Yazicioglu's Legacy: Putting Exemplary Behaviour in Context

The problems of the Turkish administrative system that Yazicioglu criticized and the solutions he proposed for them are not new. Calls for administrative reform have been a common feature of the Ottoman-Turkish administrative tradition. Fisek (2003, p. 149) counted 175 administrative reform efforts in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey in the last one and a half centuries. This continuous reform process makes Akbulut (2004, 7-8) suggest that the discipline and education of public administration in Turkey is the discipline and education of administrative reform.

The main themes of administrative reform remain surprisingly similar throughout the last 150 years. For example, calls for strengthening local governments, encouraging democratic political participation, tackling administrative inefficiency and curbing corruption can be found under the Ottoman Empire in the writings of Prince Sabahattin, a liberal reform advocate, in the turn of the 20th century (Mardin, 1992, p. 287-299). The same suggestions had been repeated numerous times since then in different administrative reform reports such as the Neumark Report (1949), Barker Report (1950), Martin and Cush Report (1951), MEHTAP Report (1963), Idari Reform Danışma Kurulu Report (1971) and KAYA Report (1991). The problem, as Polatoglu (2000, p. 141) suggested, was a concerted effort for the implementation of the report findings. Left to the discretion of the administrators of public agencies, implementation efforts suffer greatly due to the lack of a systematic implementation strategy. Surgit (1972, p. 194-195) blamed the poor communication of the reform objectives to the public servants, and the unsystematic nature of the reform process for the lack of successful implementation of reform plans. Erdogan (2000, p. 102-103; 2002, p. 278-279) brings a fresh perspective to the reform discussions by arguing that Turkey's main problem is democratization. He sees administrative reforms secondary to this objective. Heper and Cinar (1996) formulate the problem differently by suggesting that the real problem is the problematic coexistence of bureaucratic and political elites, and that these two groups have to find a way to share power in the political and administrative system.

It is fair to argue that the problems and solutions are well-known. The main problem seems to be finding the political will and skills to systematically implement these reforms. Keeping the earlier efforts for administrative reform in mind, it is possible to place the legacy of Yazicioglu in two broad categories: political and administrative. The political messages stems from the fact that a full-scale change in the administrative system, like the one he preached for, is impossible without a parallel change in the political, if not the economic system. Yazicioglu himself wrote three pamphlets on administrative and political reform, all of which he integrated in his 1995 book entitled *This System Has to Change*. His book introduced the problems of Turkey and the proposed solutions in a somewhat systematic manner.

6.2.1. Political Message

Yazicioglu's political message was one of democratization by enhancing the civic sphere at the expense of the political sphere. He had no hope for top-down change. He argued that the real change would come from bottom-up. In his own words:

“Unless the people force change, there will be no democratic restructuring or reorganization” (Yazicioglu, 1998, p. 191).

“It takes more than orders from the government to change Turkey. We must seek the authority to change things from the people. This is the key to change in Turkey. We saw an example of this reality after the [1999 Marmara] Earthquake when people did what they could with their own power and ability” (**Turkish Daily News**, 1999b).

The way that citizens could step up to this challenge, he argued, is strengthening local authorities. According to Yazicioglu, Turkey needs strong and active local and regional governments to overcome its difficulties.

We can only solve problems where they arise, and regional difficulties need to be discussed and solved in the regions; the central government should have no right to interfere. Administrative decision-making mechanisms in Turkey are highly centralized, and this creates a big obstacle to democracy and to people taking control of their own lives. Replacing centralized control with regional control would be the first step in bringing about change” (**Turkish Daily News**, November 10, 1999).

However, Yazicioglu argues that civil society is still in its infancy in Turkey. Therefore, he feels free to speak on behalf of it (Sardan and Ozdemir, 1999). He also saw himself as an adult educator, who teaches ordinary people why the system is not working well.

Yazicioglu did not get the open endorsement of a political party or interest group, even though he had received the support of some conservative parties and groups from time to time. His independent character, for one thing, was the main obstacle for him to blend in a political group, since he regards political parties in Turkey as “*sultanates of party leaders*”. Even when there was a chance of being a candidate for the national elections; he insisted on being endorsed by at least two political parties as a precondition for his candidacy (Ozdemir, 1998). Such a requirement could be interpreted both as an aspiration to be supported by a broad-based coalition, or asking the impossible, as a way of abstaining from being a politician.

Be it as it may, the line separating political and administrative criticism is a very thin one. Even Yazicioglu underlines this point as: “*Everything being said about the administration of the country is [in fact] politics*”. (Yazicioglu, 1998, p. 191).

In response to a question as to whether or not he had had any offers from political parties, Yazicioglu answered:

“I will continue to speak my mind. I don't know how this will go along with a political party's structure. As you may know, talking [freely] is not permitted [in Turkish political parties]. And I am a man who speaks [freely]... In political parties one should speak freely. However, the authoritarian structure of our parties does not allow this. It is impossible to speak one's mind, even in the parliament. In the civil service I have been speaking for 30 years. It is early to decide on joining a party. Politics is difficult in Turkey. I won't go knocking on doors. I have done what I set out to do. I can retire [now]” (Turkish Daily News, October 1, 1999).

He thought that all the existing political parties are part of the status-quo; therefore there is no use in joining one of them. Instead, he hoped to join an entirely new political movement that will be able to initiate structural change in Turkey. Yazicioglu argued that such a political movement should be organized from bottom-up as opposed to the top-down and centralized political party structures in Turkey; and it has to be organized in a way to serve the public interest instead of the interests of the political and/or administrative elites (Personal communication, January 30, 2003).

6.2.2 Administrative Message

Yazicioglu's administrative message is an eclectic one including the decentralization of government operations, limiting political influence on the bureaucracy, and switching to a presidential system for Turkey that will ensure the real separation of powers. He said that Turkey has never experienced a real separation of powers since the legislature creates the executive and the executive controls the judiciary. Yazicioglu favored a system which will empower the local people by enabling them to give decisions for their regions, to impose local taxes, assume the responsibility of every public service other than national defense, foreign relations and internal security, justice, and favored the hiring of professional managers for city management (Personal communication, January 30, 2003). Even in active duty, Yazicioglu had been continuously invited for giving speeches, and he always used these platforms to give messages about the intolerable levels of red-tape and corruption in the Turkish administrative system, and the unresponsiveness of the high-level bureaucrats to the problems of the citizens (Ozum, 2000).

An important part of his administrative legacy is his successful efforts for local, social and economic development in the districts and provinces he worked in. A good example is the improvement of vital infrastructures such roads, bridges, schools and hospitals throughout his tenure; and his efforts to promote tourism, especially in the Erzincan Province, where he worked for eight years. His strategy was to initiate citizen participation in the public services. He would ask them to donate money and labor for the projects at hand, so that together with the money coming from the general budget, more can be achieved with limited resources. Even as a district governor in Alaca of the Corum Province, and Akcakoca of the Bolu Province in the early 1980s, he built more schools with the same budgets than that of the other district governors, by encouraging citizens to take part in these projects (Personal communication, January 30, 2003). His local economic development strategies in the Tokat Province between 1983 and 1989 became a subject of scientific inquiry for two doctoral dissertations and one State Planning Organization report.

Social development was a central theme in his legacy as well. He tried to encourage the citizens to be physically and mentally active, not to spend time idly in tea-houses by smoking, watching television and playing cards. Instead he wanted them to become productive members of the society (Personal communication, January 30, 2003). In addition, Yazicioglu tried to persuade people to stop smoking and drinking, eat nutritious products, and refrain from drinking soft drinks which

contain acid and might damage people's digestive systems in the long-run. Instead, he encouraged the consumption of "ayran", which is a traditional Turkish drink made from plain yogurt by adding water and salt to it. To sum up, he asked people to become more health-conscious. The authoritarian and paternalist overtones in these encouragements bothered some citizens and the national media especially during his governorship in Tokat. His practices of discouraging alcohol and tobacco use during his tenure earned him the nickname of Murat IV, the Ottoman Sultan, who reigned from 1623 to 1640. Sultan Murat IV became infamous for banning coffee-houses, alcohol tobacco and opium use throughout the Empire, and severely punished, even executed non-compliers, while restoring state authority (Sertoglu, 1987, p. 67).

As it is seen, Yazıcıoğlu's concerns with increasing decentralization and combating corruption are also two important issues in the recent agenda of EU authorities in terms of the administrative adjustment of Turkish public administration to the EU (European Commission 2003a and 2003b; Omurgonulsen and Oktem, 2004: 58-60).

7. A Model for Exemplary Bureaucratic Behavior


The analysis of Governor Yazıcıoğlu's efforts may be incomplete without charting out a model which explains his motivations for demanding administrative reform and risking his career while doing this. Such a model can help researchers understand similar behaviors of other bureaucrats under similar circumstances. The model, which is explained in detail elsewhere (Yildiz, 2005), is presented below in Figure 1.

The model presents seven factors as important determinants of exemplary public administrator behavior. These factors are (i) the "political environment" (i.e. political developments, leaders, political party programs), (ii) "positive examples" (i.e. family members, co-workers, friends), (iii) "the amount of risk" (for being a critic of the administrative and political system), (iv) "the longevity of criticism" (which may increase the risk), (v) providing successful examples of implementation of proposed solutions/ suggestions, (vi) "the support of the media" (amount and content of media coverage), and (vii) "the support of citizens" (which can not be assessed accurately without an election).

As the exemplary public administrator concept used by Cooper and Wright (1992) suggest, the amount of risk taken by the administrators and the duration of the risk-taking behavior are important dimensions of the behavioral model. In

Yazicioglu's case, risking punishments from his superiors such as deferred promotion and/or inactive duty and freely speak his mind for more than three decades presents a considerable amount of risk, taken for a long time period. Of course, the amount of risk and the duration of risk-taking activity are related to other factors in the model, such as the ability to prove that his suggestions for reform are feasible by providing successful implementation cases as Yazicioglu did and the amount of citizen and media support for the exemplary public administrator. It should be noted that the relationships between the factors of this model are complex. It does not seem feasible for the time being to measure the individual explanatory power of each factor within this model. This might be an area for future research.

Some of the factors presented in the model are based on the empirical data presented above. Positive examples, suitable political environment, media support, and the necessity of providing successful cases of implementation are such empirically-grounded factors. Some other factors such as citizen support, amount of risk and duration of risk-taking activity are produced by using the literature and found deductively as logical parts of this model. All the factors in the model are open for detailed future empirical-testing efforts. The model as a whole needs to be tested against other cases of individual bureaucrats' behaviors. Such empirical testing will enable the model to evolve in a way to better explain the behaviors of exemplary public administrators.

Figure 1: A Model for Bureaucratic Behavior Based on the Yazicioglu Case

8. Conclusion

Probably the most important contribution of Governor Yazicioglu to the Turkish people is to increase the public awareness about the need of reforming the politics and government of Turkey. For example, he continuously emphasized the need to change the bureaucratic culture from a state-oriented culture to a citizen-oriented culture. In other words, Yazicioglu aimed to show the people that the government and

the bureaucrats exist to serve them, but not the other way around. When asked how he sees his legacy as a result of his criticisms, Yazicioglu said:

“An academican friend of mine once told me to continue to freely speak my mind [about administrative reform]. I asked him why, and he said my speeches teach the ordinary citizen why the [administrative] system is not working. “The citizens see the negative consequences of the system, but they do not know exactly what is wrong with it. They can not figure out how much of the problem is because of the system itself and how much of it is due to the [negative] personality traits of the civil servants” he said. My friend argued that what I do is adult [civic] education. I liked his viewpoint a lot. At another time in a television show that I was invited to, a citizen told me that I am like a teacher for him. Teaching... This is exactly what I am doing” (Personal communication, January 30, 2003).

His severe criticisms and unique style also in some degree legitimized the emergence of a new type of bureaucrat: entrepreneurial in his practices, freely speaking his mind, and using discretion when necessary. In doing so, he was not without support, particularly from his fellow administrators. He explains: “*No one told me that I am not saying the truth. They just said that I do not know when to stop [talking]. They asked me to slow down*” (Yazicioglu, 1998, p. 191).

Yazicioglu even said that some of his fellow administrators and some politicians call him to see if he was feeling fine when he does not speak or appear on the media for a long time (Personal communication, January 30, 2003). It can be argued that Yazicioglu performed the function of a “safety valve” for some bureaucrats and politicians, who were relieved to see someone talking about things that they prefer not to say in public in order to be politically correct.

Today, it is not surprising to see some budding Turkish administrators, who follow his steps in entrepreneurial government and rural development (Aygun, 2000). Still, there are limits to things that can be accomplished by just one person. After all, the kind of structural change Yazicioglu had been demanding requires the active political support of the citizenry, as well as the political power. However, Yazicioglu knew that the citizens gave no active support for a reform movement like his. He was complaining from the “free-rider tradition” that exists in Turkey, meaning that the people love rebels like him, who criticize the system, but the same people do not like to get involved in the struggle and take risks to change things so that their living conditions would get better (Personal communication, January 30, 2003). The passivity of people observed through a lifetime of civil service probably should have been the

most upsetting reality for a man, who believes that genuine change is possible only when there is grassroots demand for it. One may argue that exemplars, like Yazicioglu, are influential in the long run, only when they are instrumental in bringing about such grassroots demand for change. That is why it will be a great shame if Governor Yazicioglu's legacy will be of an eccentric bureaucrat, rather than that of a reform advocate and a civic educator that he really was.

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APPENDIX: The List of In-Depth Semi-Structured Interview Questions

1. When did you start criticizing the administrative system?
2. Which factors played a role in your preference of a civil service career?
3. What are the factors that shaped your character, your actions as a governor?
4. Looking back, how do you evaluate the impact of your criticisms?
5. How do you evaluate your relationship with the media? Do you think that your presence in the media overshadows your implementation efforts at times?
6. Why do you think that you were not aken out of active duty sooner? Have you ever been desperate and felt that you are not achieving anything?
7. Do you plan to go into politics?
8. Which societal groups support your efforts?
9. Which societal groups oppose your efforts?
10. How do you evaluate the change in the nature of governorship during your career?
11. Do you think that your criticisms against the administrative system constitute a coherent reform program? If not, what do you think can be done to increase its coherence?
12. Are your efforts evaluated by scientists?
13. What are your advices to young bureaucrats?
14. What do you think your legacy will be? How do you want to be remembered?